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549 
FINDING TIME FOR FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: 
CAREY V. SAFFOLD† 
The uniqueness of habeas corpus in the procedural armory of our law 
cannot be too often emphasized . . . . Its history and function in our 
legal system and the unavailability of the writ in totalitarian societies 
are naturally enough regarded as one of the decisively differentiating 
factors between our democracy and totalitarian governments.‡ 
Do not ask for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The existence of the writ of habeas corpus means that a guilty 
verdict in a criminal trial is not the end of the story.1  A state prisoner 
may challenge the constitutionality of his confinement in both the state 
and federal courts.2  However, public opinion and the courts have been 
increasingly hostile towards this collateral attack on state court 
 
 †  Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). 
 ‡  Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953) (Frankfurter J., dissenting). 
 *  John Donne, No Man is an Island, Preface to ERNEST HEMMINGWAY, FOR WHOM THE 
BELL TOLLS (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons 1940).  The full text of the poem is reprinted for 
the reader’s convenience: 
No man is an Iland, intire of it selfe; every man is a peece of the Continent, a part of the 
maine: if a Clod bee washed away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse, as well as if a 
Promontorie were, as well as if a Mannor of thy friends or of thine owne were; any mans 
death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde; And therefore never send to 
know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for thee. 
Id. 
 1. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J. dissenting).  “But habeas 
corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure. It comes in from the 
outside, not in subordination to the proceedings, and although every form may have been preserved 
opens the inquiry whether they have been more than an empty shell.”  Id.  See also 39 C.J.S. 
Habeas Corpus § 6 (1976).  Habeas Corpus is designed to give a prisoner an immediate hearing to 
inquire into and determine the legality of his confinement.  Id. 
 2. William J. Brennan, Jr., Landmarks of Legal Liberty, in THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: 
CENTENNIAL VOLUME 4 (Bernard Schwartz ed. 1970).  “[U]pon the state courts equally with the 
federal courts rests the obligation to guard, enforce and protect every right granted or secured by the 
Constitution of the United States.”  Id. 
1
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convictions.3  This hostility has been codified in the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).4  One of the most 
dramatic restrictions codified in the AEDPA was the addition of a statute 
of limitations period which imposes a strict deadline to file a federal writ 
of habeas corpus.5  A state prisoner must file a federal habeas petition 
within one year from the finalization of his state court conviction.6  This 
unprecedented restriction is relaxed slightly by a tolling provision that 
excludes from the one year period the time when a properly filed petition 
for state collateral review is pending in the state courts.7  In the case of 
Carey v. Saffold,8 the Supreme Court reviewed the state habeas corpus 
procedure in California9 and found a window open for state defendants 
into the federal statute of limitations period.10 
 
 3. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
 4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2266 (2000).  See infra, note 22 and accompanying text; Dwight 
Aarons, Criminal Law: Getting Out of this Mess: Steps Toward Addressing and Avoiding Inordinate 
Delay in Capital Cases, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 27 (1998) (explaining that prior to the 
changes made by the AEDPA there were only two substantive limitations on the availability of the 
writ; that Fourth Amendment claims were barred if the state court system provided a full and fair 
opportunity for the resolution of those claims and that prisoners could not rely on a “new rule” of 
constitutional law to collaterally attack their criminal convictions). 
 5. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000).  This is the first time a statute of limitations period has 
been applied to habeas corpus.  Doug Ward, Yet Another Habeas Corpus Hurdle: The Limitation 
Period, 35 ARK. LAW 18, 18 (2000). 
 6. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d) (2000).  Where applicable, the limitation period can actually run 
from the latest of four events: 
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or 
the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 
(B) the date upon which the impediment to filing an application created by 
unconstitutional state action was removed, assuming the applicant was prevented from 
filing by state action; 
(C) the date upon which the alleged constitutional right was recognized by the Supreme 
Court if the right was newly recognized and held applicable on habeas corpus; 
(D) the date upon which the factual predicate of the claim or claims could have been 
discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 
Id. 
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2000).  This tolling provision provides: 
[T]he time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other 
collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be 
counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 
Id.  Tolling “interrupts the running of a statute of limitations in certain situations.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1495 (defining the verb “toll” as “to stop the running of”).  The issue in Carey surrounds 
what constitutes a properly filed application for state post-conviction review.  See Carey v. Saffold, 
536 U.S. 214, 217 (2002). 
 8. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). 
 9. See In re Resendiz, 19 P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2001).  The California Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a state habeas claim and original jurisdiction to hear a new habeas 
petition filed within a “reasonable time.”  Id. 
 10. Carey, 536 U.S. at 223-27.  The AEDPA provisions apply both to state and federal 
2
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The ultimate decisions regarding equity in habeas corpus reside 
with the courts.  “[I]n a civilized society, government must always be 
accountable to the judiciary for a man’s imprisonment: if the 
imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental 
requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate 
release.”11  No matter what laws Congress adopts or the statutory 
barriers erected between prisoners and the fair hearing of their claims, it 
is the courts and ultimately, the Supreme Court that is responsible.12  It 
may make sense for the courts to concentrate on procedural mechanics 
in certain contexts, but habeas corpus is not one of them.13  To the extent 
that the Supreme Court is denying its role as guardian of the 
Constitution by hearing the procedural issues in habeas petitions while 
ignoring the merits of those same cases, and allowing lower courts to do 
the same, the criminal justice system is impoverished.14  This is more 
 
prisoners.  See Peter Sessions, Swift Justice?: Imposing a Statute of Limitations on the Federal 
Habeas Corpus Petitions of State Prisoners, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1513, 1515 (1997) (arguing that the 
AEDPA provision imposing a statute of limitations on federal habeas review of state convictions is 
fundamentally flawed).  This Note addresses the law as it applies to state petitioners for federal 
habeas corpus.  See infra Part IV. 
 11. Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 402 (1963). 
 12. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 417 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Prior to the 
passage of the AEDPA by Congress, Justice Brennan charged the Supreme Court, operating under 
the pre-1996 statutory requirements and common law, with stripping “state prisoners of virtually 
any meaningful federal review of the constitutionality of their incarceration.”  Id.  In defense of the 
Supreme Court decisions on habeas, the Court recently revisited one issue and cautioned the 
appellate courts from too hastily denying review.  See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003).  
In that case the Court again addressed the issue of when a state prisoner can appeal the dismissal or 
denial of his habeas petition.  Id. at 326  Under the AEDPA, a petitioner must obtain a “certificate 
of appealability” (COA) in order to give jurisdiction to the appellate court.  28 U.S.C. § 2253 
(2000).  Specifically, a threshold inquiry is required to determine “‘whether the circuit court may 
entertain an appeal.’”  Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 482 
(2000)).  In an eight-to-one decision, the Supreme Court held that an appellate court “should limit 
its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of [the] claims.”  Id. at 327.  This is 
consistent with the Court’s prior decision on the issue in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000).  
The Court reiterated the standard announced in Slack: 
[A] prisoner seeking a COA need only demonstrate “a substantial showing of the denial 
of a constitutional right.”  28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(2).  A petitioner satisfies this standard by 
demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of 
[the] constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are 
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 
Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327 (citing Slack, 529 U.S. at 484).  The appellate court should not be ruling 
on the merits of petitioner’s claim in this initial inquiry.  Id. at 336-337.  This decision could have 
many ramifications and could, in essence, re-open courthouse doors to state petitioners seeking 
federal review.  Linda Greenhouse, Justices Stress Inmate’s Right to Press Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 26, 2003, at A1.  The Court warned federal circuit courts “not to abdicate their responsibility to 
scrutinize state-court criminal proceedings for constitutional error.”  Id. 
 13. See infra note 14. 
 14. See, e.g., Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) (deciding the procedural issue of 
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than a problem of law, this is a question of justice.15 
This Note begins by looking at the history of the writ of habeas 
corpus in the United States.16  There is a brief overview of the 
background and history of the AEDPA, specifically targeting the 
changes the AEDPA made to the law of federal habeas corpus.17  Next, 
the habeas corpus procedure in California is reviewed.18  Finally, this 
Note explains the Supreme Court’s decision in Carey v. Saffold, 
focusing on the Court’s policy rationale and what the lack of support for 
habeas corpus means for the future of the writ.19 
 
timeliness and remanding a specific procedural question that would determine whether the merits 
are going to be heard); Lester v. South Carolina, No. 02-7382, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2183 (4th 
Cir. 2003) (discussing the very high bar to obtain review after a district court has denied a habeas 
petition on procedural grounds); Smith v. Newland, No. C 99-4596 CRB (PR), 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2459 at *11-12 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (denying a habeas petition after remand, as untimely and 
deeming the reasons for the untimeliness as inadequate).  Federal habeas corpus is available to all 
state prisoners, regardless of their sentence, so long as they are confined.  See Parker v. Ellis, 362 
U.S. 574, 575-76 (1960) (noting habeas is meaningless without a restraint of liberty).  State 
petitioners facing the death penalty, however, are in a different situation when their claims are 
procedurally barred.  In a case concerning the death penalty specifically, Justice Brennan noted that 
both the decision to take a person out of society and the decision to take a life should be carefully 
scrutinized by the courts: 
Those whom we would banish from society or from the human community itself often 
speak in too faint a voice to be heard above society’s demand for punishment.  It is the 
particular role of the courts to hear these voices, for the Constitution declares that the 
majoritarian chorus may not alone dictate the conditions of social life.  The Court thus 
fulfills, rather than disrupts, the scheme of separation of powers by closely scrutinizing 
the impositions of the death penalty, for no decision of a society is more deserving of 
“sober second thought.” 
McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 343 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Harlan F. Stone, 
The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 25 (1936)).  The majority decision in 
McClesky took a different tone: “Apparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our 
criminal justice system . . . . McClesky’s claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious 
question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system.”  McClesky, 481 U.S. at 312-
15. 
 15. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Crisis and Constitutionalism, 63 MONT. L. REV. 277, 288 n.38 
(2002).  Professor Gerhardt explains that a potential constitutional crisis occurs when two branches 
of government join together to retaliate against a defenseless portion of the population. Id. In this 
context, it would be that the legislature and the judiciary have joined to retaliate against state 
prisoners.  Charging the Supreme Court with stepping down from the challenge of reconciling 
consistency and fairness in the death penalty, Justice Blackmun explains that the Court has chosen 
instead to replace “substantive constitutional requirements with mere aesthetics.”  Callins v. Collins, 
510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J. dissenting). 
 16. See infra Part II.A. 
 17. See infra Part II.B. 
 18. See infra Part II.C. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss3/4
MARSHALL2.DOC 4/19/2004  10:25 AM 
2004] CAREY V. SAFFOLD 553 
II. BACKGROUND 
The debate over habeas corpus use and reform is not new; there 
have been discussions concerning the extent of the use of the writ for 
years.20  Unfortunately, recent events in American history have had a 
decisive, albeit imprudent, role in the shaping of the current habeas 
corpus legislation.21 
A. Historical Perspective 
The writ of habeas corpus exists to protect American citizens from 
being unconstitutionally held by the government.22  It is a tool of 
 
 20. See Alexander Rundlet, Comment, Opting for Death: State Responses to the AEDPA’s 
Opt-In Provisions and the Need for a Right to Post-Conviction Counsel, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 661 
(1999) (taking an extensive look at habeas reform debate); 135 Cong. Rec. S13472 (daily ed. Oct. 
16, 1989) (statement of Sen. Biden), available at 1989 WL 185894 (“[Habeas corpus] has been the 
issue of debate . . . at least for the seventeen years that I have been a Senator . . . .”).  The 1995 U.S. 
Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics Study on Federal Habeas Corpus began by 
describing the debate over habeas issues: 
These [habeas] petitions raise basic questions about the respective institutional roles of 
the Federal and State courts, the finality of the criminal legal process, and the efficiency 
of Federal review. Is a Federal examination of issues already adjudicated in the State 
courts necessary to preserve individual constitutional rights? Is swift and sure 
punishment, a goal of the criminal justice system, compromised or maintained by 
review? Are the courts in control of habeas corpus litigation or do these cases take on 
lives of their own? These kinds of questions are part of a perennial debate among 
national and State policymakers, judges, and attorneys concerning the appropriate scope 
of review, with one side seeking to restrict the scope of Federal review and the other side 
seeking to maintain or to expand the scope. 
ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W. K. DALEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
REVIEW: CHALLENGING STATE COURT CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS iv (Bureau of Justice Statistics 
Publ’n, 1995), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fhcrcscc.pdf [hereinafter 1995 
Department of Justice Study]. 
 21. See Andrea A. Kochan, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: 
Habeas Corpus Reform?, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 399, 407-08 (1997).  The AEDPA, 
with the attached habeas provisions, was passed on April 19, 1996, one year after the Oklahoma 
City Federal Building was bombed, supposedly in response to that act of “domestic terrorism.”  Id.  
Additionally, it has been noted that terrorism served as the driving force to push the habeas 
measures through both Houses.  Rundlet, supra note 20, at 702. 
 22. See John H. Blume & David P. Voisin, An Introduction to Federal Habeas Corpus 
Practice and Procedure, 47 S.C. L. REV. 271, 272-73 (1996).  The root of habeas corpus is the 
principle that an individual is entitled to immediate release if their imprisonment cannot be shown to 
conform to due process.  Id.  The federal writ of habeas corpus can be exercised by state prisoners 
under five different conditions: 
The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless: 
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is 
committed for trial before some court thereof; or 
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an 
order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or 
5
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collateral attack upon the criminal conviction.23  Habeas petitions 
contain claims of constitutional violations that occurred at trial which 
make the subsequent confinement of a prisoner unconstitutional.24  The 
court reviewing a petition can grant the writ or deny the petition.25  If a 
 
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution of laws or treaties of the United 
States; or 
(4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in custody for an act 
done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or 
exemption claimed under the commission, order or sanction of any foreign state, or 
under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the law of nations; or 
(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify for trial. 
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (2000). 
The uniqueness of habeas corpus in the procedural armory of our law cannot be too often 
emphasized.  It differs from all other remedies in that it is available to bring into question 
the legality of a person’s restraint and to require justification for such detention.  Of 
course this does not mean that prison doors may readily be opened.  It does mean that 
explanation may be exacted why they should remain closed. 
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 433, 512 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). 
 23. Larry W. Yackle, The American Bar Association and Federal Habeas Corpus, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 171 (1998) [hereinafter Yackle, American Bar]. 
In theory, a federal habeas corpus petition is an independent civil suit, in which the 
prisoner asks only that the federal court determine the validity of  his current detention.  
In substance, a habeas action constitutes a collateral challenge to the prisoner’s treatment 
in state court.  When the prisoner claims that his detention violates federal law, the 
warden invariably responds that the prisoner’s criminal conviction and sentence justify 
the custody about which he complains.  That, in turn, places the validity of the 
conviction or sentence before the federal court for review. 
Id. at 172. But see In re Bittaker, 55 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1012 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that 
California law does not characterize the writ of habeas corpus as civil).  Once the avenue of direct 
review has been exhausted by the prisoner, he can then make an argument to the state court that his 
confinement is unlawful due to a constitutional violation at the criminal trial.  Yackle, American 
Bar, supra, at 172.  After exhausting state remedies, the constitutional argument can then be made 
to the federal courts.  Id. 
 24. See Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1034-40 
(1985).  “[Habeas Corpus] ensures the availability of trial-level federal forum to litigants whose 
federal claims arise initially as defenses to state criminal prosecutions.”  Id. at 1019.  Ineffective 
assistance of counsel is the constitutional claim Saffold made in all of his habeas petitions. See 
Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 2-3, Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) (No. 01-301), 
available at 2002 WL 122615 [hereinafter Respondent’s Brief].  The right to counsel is a 
constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  To establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel under either the federal or state guarantee, a defendant must meet the test 
enumerated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).  A defendant must show 
first, counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms and second, counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial, or in other words, 
that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s failings, the result would have been more 
favorable to the defendant.  Id.  See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Roe v. Flores-
Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000); In re Resendiz, 19 P.3d 1171, 1183-87 (Cal. 2001).  State denial of 
“full and fair” litigation, under the Fourth Amendment is another basis for habeas relief.  See, e.g., 
U. S. ex rel. Conroy v. Bombard, 426 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2000).  Habeas corpus is Latin for “that you have the body.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 715 (7th ed. 1999).  Federal law provides that “[T]he person to whom the writ is 
6
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petition is granted, the court will issue an order requiring an explanation 
of the violations alleged in the petition from both sides.26  It is not until 
after the hearing on the merits that the relief requested in the petition is 
granted or denied.27 
Habeas corpus has its roots in the English legal tradition.28  An 
early form of the writ simply required people to appear in court; it did 
not concern criminal detention.29  It was known in the common law as 
early as the fifteenth century.30  The English courts of Chancery, King’s 
Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer all issued the writ.31  Habeas 
corpus developed into the writ of liberty when petitioners could 
challenge confinements by the courts and detentions mandated by the 
King.32  Habeas corpus was “efficacious [in correcting the injustices] in 
all manner of illegal confinement.”33  Blackstone went so far as to 
describe it as the “bulwark of the British Constitution.”34   
 
directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person detained.”  28 U.S.C. § 
2243 (2000).  The writ is usually directed at the warden of the jail because warden is the one can 
produce the detainee for release.  See e.g. Carey, 536 U.S. at 214 (listing Tom L. Carey as the 
warden).  In the initial habeas petition, the respondent is the person who has custody over the 
petitioning inmate.  Id.  This type of writ, habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, is directed to “someone 
detaining another person and commanding that the detainee be brought to court.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra, at 715.  There are several other types of habeas writs: habeas corpus as 
deliberandum et recipiendum; habeas corpus ad faiendum et recipiendum; habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum; habeas corpus ad respondendum; and habeas corpus ad testificandum.  Id. 
 26. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2000).  After the writ is filed, the federal court entertaining the petition 
will “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should 
not be granted” and then a hearing date is set.  Id.  See also Durdines v. People, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 217 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (deciding that if a petition states a prima facie claim for relief then the superior 
court must either issue the writ or an order to show cause). 
 27. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 28. Brief Amici Curiae of Legal Historians Listed Herein in Support of Respondent,  INS v. 
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (No. 00-767), 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 465, 468 n.3 (2002), [hereinafter 
Legal Historians] (citing R.J. Sharpe, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 6-8 (2d ed. 1989).  The writ 
has been traced as far back as the fifteenth century.  Id. at 468.  See ROLLIN C. HURD, A TREATISE 
ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (2d ed. 1856) 
reprinted in DA CAPO PRESS REPRINTS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 
(Leonard W. Levy ed., 1972); 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 104-25  (Methuen 
Co., Sweet & Maxwell, 1966 reprint) (2d ed. 1938); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 129-38  (facsimile reprint, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1979) (1st ed. 1765-
1769); see also Alan Clarke, Habeas Corpus: The Historical Debate, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 
375, 378 (1998) (tracing the writ to its origins as early as 1230 through the present day). 
 29. Clarke, supra note 28, at 378 (placing the origin of the writ as a prerogative writ of the 
Crown which was used to require people to appear at court). 
 30. Legal Historians, supra note 28, at 468. 
 31. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 715 (7th ed. 1999). 
 32. Clarke supra note 28, at 383. 
 33. Legal Historians, supra note 28, at 468 (quoting 3 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 131). 
 34. Id. (citing 4 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 438). 
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Early colonial provisions ensured the use of the writ in America. 35  
At the Constitutional Convention, Charles Pinckney was the first 
delegate to propose a provision to include the writ of habeas corpus.36  
There was debate at the Convention as to whether the writ should be 
subject to suspension or not.37  The final version of the clause contained 
in Article 1, section 9, clause 2 of the Constitution provides, “[t]he 
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless 
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require 
it.”38  Congress gave the first power to issue the writ to federal judges in 
1789.39  The writ was extended to state prisoners in 1833.40  Habeas law 
continues to evolve today.41 
Article one, section 9, clause 2, popularly referred to as the 
 
 35. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Individual Liberties within the Body of the Constitution: A 
Symposium: Thinking about Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748, 751-52 (1987).  Many 
of the American colonies provided for the writ either in common law, by statute or in their charters.  
Id.  See also William F. Duker, A Constitutional History of Habeas Corpus, in 13 CONTRIBUTIONS 
IN LEGAL STUDIES 3-179 (Paul L. Murphy ed., 1980); Max Rosenn, The Great Writ - A Reflection 
of Societal Change, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337 (1983) (giving an excellent review of the history of habeas 
corpus). 
 36. Duker, supra note 35, at 127.  Pinckney brought up the writ several times in the 
Constitutional Convention.  Id.  He first mentioned the writ of habeas corpus in his “Draught of the 
Federal Government,” four days after the Convention convened in Philadelphia.  Id.  Pinckney later 
proposed an amendment to an article dealing with the judiciary by providing: 
The privileges and benefits of the writ of habeas corpus shall be enjoyed in this 
government in the most expeditious and ample manner: and shall not be suspended by 
the Legislature except upon the most urgent and pressing occasion and for a time period 
not exceeding . . . months. 
Id.  Another delegate at the Convention, Mr. Morris, proposed a compromise version, “The 
privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless where in cases of Rebellion or 
invasion the public Safety may require it.” Id. at 131.  The clause was passed and later moved to its 
Article 1 position by the Committee on Style and Arrangement.  Id. at 131.  But see Jordan Steiker, 
Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is there a Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for 
State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862, 871-72 (1994) (placing emphasis on the placement of the 
clause as a limit on federal interference with the writ).  There seems to be no significance in the 
change from the affirmative to the negative.  Duker, supra note 35, at 129. 
 37. Id. at 128.  Given the recent history of English depravation of rights, some delegates saw 
no need for the new government to ever suspend the writ.  Id.  Some delegates opposed to allowing 
for suspension of the writ at all.  Id.  Indeed, the availability of habeas corpus was important to early 
Americans because of their past history with King George and the fear of a new “King George 
Washington.”  Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New Federalism 
after the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 337, 
339 (1997). 
 38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 39. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
 40. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, 4 Stat. 634. 
 41. See infra Part IV.  AEDPA is just the latest of an on-going conversation as to the use and 
purpose of the writ.  See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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“Suspension Clause,” gives two powers to the federal government.42  
One is the power to grant the writ of habeas corpus.43  The other is the 
power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.44  These powers have been 
exercised in different ways by all three branches of government.45  
President Lincoln found cause to suspend the writ of habeas corpus 
during the Civil War.46  This was the only time in history the writ of 
habeas corpus was suspended by the executive branch; subsequent 
suspensions have come from the legislative branch.47  There have been 
several occasions where Congress authorized the President to suspend 
the writ.48  Congress has also passed statutes ordaining the use and 
 
 42. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  The power to suspend the writ implies the power to 
grant the writ.  See id. 
 43. For a debate on whether the Suspension Clause requires federal courts to make available 
the remedy of habeas corpus, see Charles D. Weisselberg, Evidentiary Hearings in Federal Habeas 
Corpus Cases, 1990 BYU L. REV. 131, 134-35 (1990).  Congress has given this power to the courts 
and the courts in turn have exercised this power.  Id.  The extent to which the writ should be used is 
debated  The Constitution does not define or explain the writ, it simply provides for it.  Id. 
 44. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 45. See infra, notes 46-50 and accompanying text. 
 46. Duker, supra note 35, at 168.  Lincoln authorized the suspension of habeas corpus several 
times during the Civil War.  Id. at 168 n.110.  In order to declare martial law, the writ of habeas 
corpus must be suspended.  In Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866), Lambdin P. Milligan was tried 
in a military court in Indiana for his anti-Union activities during the Civil War.  Id.  He was 
convicted and sentenced to death.  Id. at 107.  His habeas claim was that the military commission 
had no jurisdiction to try him because he was a citizen of the United States and of Indiana and as 
such, he had a Constitutional right to a trial by jury.  Id. at 108.  The Supreme Court agreed.  Id. at 
126.  Writing for the majority, Justice Davis stated, “[u]nquestionably, there is then an exigency 
which demands that the government, if it should see fit in the exercise of a proper discretion to 
make arrests, should not be required to produce the persons arrested in answer to a writ of habeas 
corpus.  The Constitution goes no further.”  Id.  The Constitution allows for a suspension of the 
writ, but it does not also allow for a person to be tried in a military court.  Ex parte Miligan, 71 U.S. 
at 126.  Milligan was released from prison.  Id. at 131.  For more on the historical background of 
Milligan’s arrest, see Allan Nevines, The Case of the Copperhead Conspirator, in QUARRELS THAT 
HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION (John A. Garraty ed., 1964). 
 47. JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 373 (James W. 
Davis ed., 2nd ed. 1940) (stating the generally accepted view is the power to suspend was vested in 
the legislative branch). 
 48. Duker, supra note 35, at 178 n.190.  Pursuant to congressional order, President Grant 
suspended habeas in nine counties in North Carolina in order to fight the Klu Klux Klan in 1871.  
Id.  In 1905, when Theodore Roosevelt was President, the Philippine civil commission authorized 
the governor to suspended habeas in the Philippines, pursuant to a congressional act.  Id.  See Fisher 
v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174 (1906) (explaining the ability of a governing body, not the President, to 
declare martial law).  The writ was suspended from January to October in two provinces due to 
terrorism and guerilla attacks on the people by an organized group of insurgents.  Id. at 181.  
Another significant suspension of habeas corpus occurred in 1941.  See generally, Harry N. 
Scheiber & Jane L. Scheiber, Bayonets in Paradise: A Half-Century Retrospect on Martial Law in 
Hawai’i, 1941-1946, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 477 (1997).  On December 7, 1941, after the Japanese 
planes left Hawaii, the then territory of the United States, was placed under martial law by the 
civilian territorial governor.  Id. at 480.  The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was provided 
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availability of the writ.49  The judicial branch has interpreted those 
statutes in various ways to extend and constrict the power of habeas.50  
In the forty years before the changes in the AEDPA, United States 
Supreme Court decisions touched every aspect of habeas.51 
 
for in the Hawaii Organic Act, ch. 339, § 67, 31 Stat. 141 (1900), “in case of rebellion or invasion, 
or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it.”  Id.  Martial law, including the 
suspension of habeas corpus, was supported by the “fears of impending land invasion and 
subversion” by the Japanese.  Id.  Martial law persisted until President Truman restored the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and formally terminated martial law by Presidential 
Proclamation on October 24, 1944.  Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 313 n.5 (1946). 
 49. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (creating the lower federal courts and 
giving the power to grant habeas only to federal judges); Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, 4 Stat. 634 
(making habeas available to state prisoners); Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 188, 5 Stat. 539 (including 
state prisoners who were foreign nationals); Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 20, 14 Stat. 385 (expanding the 
writ to all state and federal cases where the conviction resulted from a violation of any United States 
law, treaty or the federal Constitution); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1988), amended by 28 U.S.C. §§ 
2244-2255 (1996).  See also Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal 
Constitutional Claims Raised by State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive 
Proceduralism, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 338-39 (1998) (stating the impact of other 
congressional acts on habeas). 
 50. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing judicial review of all cases arising 
under the Constitution).  See Alan Clarke, Habeas Corpus: The Historical Debate, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. 
J. HUM. RTS. 375 (1998), for an overview of three major cases decided by John Marshall.  It is 
beyond the scope of this Note to explore all the decisions of the Supreme Court in relation to habeas 
corpus rights; however, a recent overview of Supreme Court trends may be helpful to see the 
chronology of the present controversy.  See Andrea A. Kochan, supra note 21, at 402 n.19 (stating 
that “the courts will have to look at decisional law to fill in the gaps created by the [AEDPA]”); c.f. 
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (examining § 2254 in light of existing federal habeas 
corpus practice). 
 51. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 35; David Gottlieb & Randall Coyne, Panel 
Discussion, Habeas Corpus Practice in State and Federal Courts, 31 N.M. L. REV. 201, 201 (2001) 
(stating the restrictive view of habeas taken by the court in the last twenty years has failed to 
account for any satisfactory role for habeas in this generation); Steiker, supra note 36.  In general, 
the 1960’s were a period of expansion of the writ of habeas corpus.  E.g., Sanders v. United States, 
373 U.S. 1 (1963) (creating a standard for successive petitions); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 434-35 
(1963) (defining a test for the exhaustion requirement); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) 
(stating circumstances where an evidentiary hearing for federal habeas is necessary).  See Steiker, 
supra note 36, at 862.  The Warren Court “established the groundwork for the modern interpretation 
of federal habeas corpus review.”  Kochan, supra note 21, at 402.  Also, the court provided 
procedural safeguards for defendants.  Chemerinsky, supra note 35, at 755.  The Warren court “saw 
its role and the purpose of habeas corpus as preventing people from being detained if their 
conviction resulted from unconstitutional conduct.”  Id. at 757.  The Burger Court, in the 1970’s, cut 
back on some of the previous expansions and showed less concern for defendants’ rights.  Id. at 
761.  See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 
(1976), Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).  The 1990’s 
continued to place stricter standards on habeas corpus.  E.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S 722 
(1991); McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); Keeney v. Tomayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992); 
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).  See Jordan 
Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 303, 303-04 (1993) (arguing the only 
exception to the Court’s curtailing of habeas is the emphasis on factual innocence as a safe guard to 
allow a petition to go forward).  The Rehnquist court, unlike the Warren court, has blocked 
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Exercise of both the suspension powers and the granting powers of 
the writ of habeas corpus have been controversial.52  There is historical 
debate over the original intent of the framers for the writ.53  The 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus by both the executive and the 
legislative branches has been criticized by the courts.54  Adding to the 
debate are differing opinions on the modern purpose of the writ and the 
issue of the death penalty.55 
Popular opinion equates habeas petitions with death row inmates 
because such proceedings are brought to the public’s attention through 
the media when the imposition of the death penalty is delayed in high 
profile cases.56  Arguably, this is a narrow view of the purpose of the 
writ.57  “The Great Writ” is the last chance an innocent person has to be 
freed from a sentence for a crime he did not commit.58  This is especially 
heightened in cases where the sentence is death.59  It is often the time 
 
petitioners from the federal courts.  David Blumberg, Note, Habeas Leaps from the Pan and into the 
Fire: Jacobs v. Scott and the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 61 ALB. L. 
REV. 557, 560 (1997). 
 52. See supra, notes 42-51 and accompanying text. 
 53. Chemerinsky, supra note 35, at 751. 
 54. See, e.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946).  The Supreme Court 
rebuked the declaration of martial law that included the use of military tribunals instead of courts.  
Id.  “Extraordinary measures in Hawaii, however necessary, are not supportable on the mistaken 
premise that Hawaiian inhabitants are less entitled to constitutional protection than others . . . . The 
people of Hawaii are therefore entitled to constitutional protection to the same extent as the 
inhabitants of the 48 States.”  Id. at 318-19.  The decision came five years after the declaration of 
martial law began in 1941 and two years after it was officially terminated in 1944.  See supra note 
48 and accompanying text. 
 55. See Yackle, American Bar, supra note 23.  “Proponents of the death penalty seem to 
regard federal habeas corpus as no more than a delaying tactic.”  Id. at 191; But see Gottlieb & 
Coyne, supra note 51, at 209 (noting the recent studies have shown the importance of careful review 
of capital cases due to the high rate of error).  Also, there is proof that death row prisoners do not 
use habeas as a delaying tactic.  Blumberg, supra note 51, at 579 (citing the states without the death 
penalty do not have fewer habeas petitions). 
 56. Id.  “It’s as though habeas exists only for death penalty cases and no longer tests the 
validity of human incarceration more generally.”  Id.  It has also been argued that the reason for the 
AEDPA habeas legislation is that Congress and much of the public assume habeas claims are almost 
always frivolous.  Ronald J. Tabak, Habeas Corpus as a Crucial Protector of Constitutional Rights: 
A Tribute Which May Also Be a Eulogy, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1477, 1489 (1996); See also 
Gottlieb & Coyne, supra note 51, at 202 (noting AEDPA was primarily designed to deal with 
habeas petitions in capital cases). 
 57. Yackle, American Bar, supra note 23, at 192.  The writ of habeas corpus is a restraint on 
governmental power.  Id.  It allows a court to review the validity of a criminal detention.  Id.  There 
are broader consequences when a court can review the use of power of another branch than the 
narrow emphasis on the writ as recourse for capital defendants.  Id. 
 58. Gottlieb & Coyne, supra note 51, at 202.  An innocent person who is convicted wrongly 
must serve the criminal sentence while the habeas petition is filed.  Id. 
 59. Robert Batey, Federal Habeas Corpus Relief and the Death Penalty: “Finality with a 
Capital F,” 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 252, 264-65 (1984) (“To exact [forfeiture of potentially meritorious 
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consuming process of the petition that critics focus on and not the 
philosophic underpinnings of the civil liberty.60 
B. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
The 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building was a 
turning point for the writ of habeas corpus.61  Proposed reforms of 
habeas corpus were already in Congress at this time.62  Coming upon the 
 
claims] for any procedural default is callous; to exact the ultimate penalty for a lawyer’s procedural 
default is truly monstrous.”).  There is no recourse for the convicted after the death penalty is 
executed.  Id. 
 60. See 1995 Department of Justice Study, supra note 20.  Recent studies have refuted 
common misconceptions about the death penalty.  The 1995 study by the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics was specifically aimed at explaining “case processing time,” because “assumptions about 
timeliness underlie almost all of the various positions in the policy debate.”  Id. at v.  Additionally, a 
1991 Department of Justice study found that only 1% of all state prisoners filed habeas petitions in 
federal court.  Blumberg, supra note 51, at 577. But see VICTOR E. FLANGO, NATIONAL CENTER 
FOR STATE COURTS, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 14 tbl.1 (1994) (showing 
the number of habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in federal court grew from 1,030 in 
1961 to 10, 323 in 1991).  Also, the length of time that habeas petitions take depends largely on the 
number of issues presented.  Blumberg, supra, at 579.  This kind of emphasis on procedural and 
administrative issues undermines the original purpose of the writ. 
It is not the boasting of empty rhetoric that has treated the writ of habeas corpus as the 
basic safeguard of freedom in the Anglo-American world. “The great writ of habeas 
corpus has been for centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of personal 
freedom.”  Mr. Chief Justice Chase, writing for the Court, in Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 
85, 95 (1868).  Its history and function in our legal system and the unavailability of the 
writ in totalitarian societies are naturally enough regarded as one of the decisively 
differentiating factors between our democracy and totalitarian governments.  The 
significance of the writ for the moral health of our kind of society has been amply 
attested by all the great commentators, historians and jurists, on our institutions. 
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953).  There is even some support by death penalty advocates 
for the proposition that the focus on procedure over substance is not correct.  Joseph L. Hoffmann, 
Substance and Procedure in Capital Cases: Why Federal Habeas Courts Should Review the Merits 
of Every Death Sentence, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1771, 1782 (2000).  Overemphasis on Eighth 
Amendment procedures by the federal courts and too little emphasis on individual, substantively 
warranted remedies has led to an over-reversal of death sentences.  Id. 
 61. Rundlet, supra note 20, at 701.  One-hundred and sixty-eight people were killed when a 
bomb inside of a truck exploded in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma, on the morning of April 19, 1995.  The Bombing (1996) at http://www.cnn.com/ 
us/okc/bombing.html (March 20, 1996).  This catastrophic event was only two years after the 1993 
bombing of the World Trade Center.  Id.  “The [Oklahoma City] bombing appears to have renewed 
Congressional resolve to respond to the need to reform federal habeas corpus procedure.”  Rundlet, 
supra note 20, at 701.  The AEDPA was signed into effect just after the one year anniversary of the 
April 19th attack.  Kochan, supra note 21, at 399.  “The American people do not want to witness the 
spectacle of these terrorists abusing our judicial system and delaying the imposition of a just 
sentence by filing appeal after meritless appeal.”  142 CONG. REC. S3352, S3354 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 
1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 62. Rundlet, supra note 20, at 690.  In June 1988, retired Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell 
chaired a study on habeas in capital cases that the Congress consulted in numerous habeas 
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one-year anniversary of the bombing, Congress sought to pass a bill 
aimed at combating terrorism.63  Killing two birds with one stone, 
Congress added several habeas petitions to a bill aimed at combating 
domestic terrorism.64  The result was the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).65  There is evidence that the final product 
did more to change the law of habeas corpus than to combat terrorism.66 
 
amendment proposals between 1990 and 1995.  Id. at n.169. 
 63. Blumberg, supra note 51, at 582.  The need to appear tough on crime in an election year 
was a decisive factor in passing AEDPA.  Id.  “[AEDPA] was adopted, in part, as a reaction to acts 
of domestic terrorism and, in part, due to political pressure exerted by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
others on the Court.”  Id.  Further, “[d]ebates in the House and the Senate leading up to the vote on 
AEDPA reveal that many of the changes that were made to habeas corpus were not responsive to 
the needs of the victims of the Oklahoma City bombing.”  Rundlet, supra note 20, at 701. 
 64. Id.  The restrictive habeas corpus measures would apply to any subsequent criminal 
convictions related to the bombing.  See statement of Sen. Hatch, supra note 61.  In June 1997, a 
jury convicted Timothy McVeigh of the Oklahoma City bombing and sentenced him to die by lethal 
injection.  Oklahoma City Bombing Trials (1997) available at www.cnn.com/us/9703/okc.trial.  
Michael Fortier and Terry Nichols were also convicted, in separate trials, for acts relating to the 
bombing.  The Worst Terror attack on U.S. Soil: April 19,1995 (Dec. 30, 1995) available at 
http://www.cnn.com/US/OKC/daily/9512/12-30/index.html.  McVeigh’s conviction was affirmed 
on appeal by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals.  United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1222 
(10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1007 (1999).  McVeigh filed a habeas claim under the 
AEDPA’s § 2255 asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of a fair and impartial jury and 
denial of due process because the government withheld evidence.  United States v. McVeigh, 118 F. 
Supp.2d 1137, 1139 (D. Co. 2000).  The petition was denied by the district court.  Id. at 1155.  
McVeigh filed a motion to forgo any further judicial appeals, citing United States v. Hammer, 226 
F.3d 229, 236-237 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding a death penalty defendant can waive his rights to direct 
appeal).  Transcript of McVeigh hearing, Dec. 28, 2000 available at http://www.cnn.com/2000/ 
LAW/12/28/mcveigh.hearing. transcript/index.html.  He did not, however, waive his right to request 
an executive appeal.  Id.  Judge Richard Matsch noted the seriousness of this request in light of the 
restrictions Congress had levied against habeas procedures in the AEDPA and told McVeigh, 
“[Y]ou can not in any way assume or count on the availability to you of a new, as you say, habeas 
or a new motion to vacate the sentence under 2255.”  Id.  Five days before the scheduled execution 
the same court denied a stay of execution.  United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68-M, 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 7151 at *1 (D. Co. June 6, 2001).  Upon affirming the district court the next day, the 
Tenth Circuit, in the alternative, also denied the appeal as a petition for a subsequent habeas appeal.  
United States v. McVeigh, 9 Fed. Appx. 980 (10th Cir. Jun 7, 2001) (per curium).  Under § 
2244(b)(3), a court of appeals must authorize a successive habeas petition before it is filed in the 
district court.  28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(3) (2000).  That decision is not appealable.  28 U.S.C. § 2244 
(b)(3)(E) (2000).  McVeigh, the first federal prisoner to be executed in thirty-eight years, died by 
lethal injection on Monday, June 11, 2001 in a federal prison in Indiana.  The Execution of Timothy 
McVeigh 2001 at http://www.cnn.com/ SPECIALS/2001/okc/. 
 65. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2266 
(2000).  The AEDPA passed in the Senate by a 91-8 vote.  142 Cong. Rec. D322-02 (daily ed. Apr. 
17, 1996) (Vote No. 71).  It passed in the House by a 293-133 vote.  142 Cong. Rec. D334-01 (daily 
ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (Roll No. 126). 
 66. See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.  Several of the people held in Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba by the United States military after being captured abroad during the hostilities in 
Afghanistan that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were recently denied access 
to the American court system altogether, thus the habeas corpus portion of “anti-terrorism” bill will 
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The AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. sections 2241-2255 and added 
sections 2261-2266.67  The amended section 2244 limits the availability 
of successive habeas petitions, imposes a procedural hurdle and extends 
the deference given to the state court decisions. 68  It also creates a 
statute of limitations period, which is subject to a tolling provision, for 
filing a federal habeas petition.69  Section 2254(d) limits the scope of 
review of a state court decision by a federal court in habeas cases.70  
Section 2254 also maintains an exhaustion requirement.71  Section 2261 
 
also not apply to them.  See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  The 
detainees were not within the territory of the United States at any point, and therefore: 
[N]o court in this country has jurisdiction to grant habeas relief, under 28 U.S.C. § 
2241 . . . .  We cannot see why, or how, the writ may be made available to aliens abroad 
when basic constitutional protections are not . . . .  If the Constitution does not entitle the 
detainees to due process, and it does not, they cannot invoke the jurisdiction of our 
courts to test the constitutionality or the legality of restraints on their liberty. 
Id. at 1141.  These foreign nationals, “cannot seek release based on violations of the Constitution or 
treaties or federal law; the courts are not open to them.”  Id. at 1145. 
 67. See Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381 
(1996) (providing a thorough review of the changes AEDPA has made to habeas).  The list of 
changes and additions, infra, is meant only to be illustrative for the case at hand and is not meant to 
be exhaustive.  The AEDPA changes to title 153 (2241-2255) affects both capital and non-capital 
cases where as, the addition of title 154 deals only with death penalty cases.  Yackle, supra at 385. 
 68. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (a)-(c) (2000).  The Supreme Court further restricted successive 
petitions in Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 661 (2001).  See Ronn Gehring, Note, Tyler v. Cain: A 
Fork in the Path for Habeas Corpus or the End of the Road for Collateral Review?, 36 AKRON L. 
REV. 181, 211 (2002) (arguing Tyler’s virtual elimination of the availability of successive habeas 
petitions is a violation of the Suspension Clause). 
 69. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1) (2000).  § 2244(d)(1) provides that “[a] one-year time period of 
limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus.”  The limitation  period can start 
running from the latest of four events: final review of the conviction, the removal of state action that 
caused an impediment to filing, the addition of a constitutional right by the Supreme Court or the 
discovery, through due diligence of facts to underlie a constitutional claim.  Id.  See supra note 6 
and accompanying text.  Also, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2000) allows “the time during which a 
properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 
pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under 
this subsection.”  That tolling provision is at the heart of Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002).  
Another issue, not in controversy in Carey, but also judiciable under the tolling provision is in 
regards to equitable tolling.  See infra Part IV.C.  Equitable tolling allows a court to continue with 
an action, even though the statutory time limit has expired, because justice requires it.  See Irwin v. 
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 94-6 (1990). 
 70. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) (2000).  The Supreme Court has addressed this “standard of review” 
provision in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362 (2000).  Before AEDPA, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 
288 (1989), placed a limitation on granting habeas where the existing law was not already 
established.  See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 
96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973 (1996) (listing pre-AEDPA restrictions on habeas in general). 
 71. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a)-(c) (2000).  The Court first adopted the “exhaustion doctrine” in Ex 
parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886).  In Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982), the Court held that 
all claims in a mutli-part petition could be dismissed if the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies 
with respect to any one of the claims. 
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addresses procedural issues unique to capital habeas petitions.72  Many 
of the changes concern procedural requirements.73 
The AEDPA has stirred a lot of controversy since its inception.74  
Many people have expressed their concerns about the potential of the 
Act.75  There is much speculation as to whether the AEDPA codified 
previous common law or changed the law.76  The Supreme Court will 
 
 72. 28 U.S.C. § 2261-2266 (2000).  These provisions were designed to “combat lengthy 
habeas appeals, the favorite misconception of habeas critics.”  Blumberg, supra note 51, at 584. 
 73. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text. 
 74. E.g., Yackle, American Bar, supra note 23, at 171; Sessions, supra note 10, at 1531 
(arguing the new AEDPA statute of limitations provision cannot be justified by its supporters, is 
poorly written, and makes it practically impossible for state prisoners to present their claims 
adequately within the mandatory one-year deadline).  Between hurdles placed in front of federal 
habeas petitions in the AEDPA and Congress’ cutting of funds for Post-Conviction Defender 
Organizations, the American Bar Association (ABA) proposed a moratorium on the death penalty.  
James E. Coleman, Jr., 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3 (1998); Yackle American Bar, supra at 
171.  The ABA took part in many forums and debates concerning habeas reform prior to 1996, but 
concluded that a moratorium would be the only effective way to draw attention to the problems of 
the current system.  Yackle, American Bar, supra at 175-76.  Specifically, the time limits imposed 
by AEDPA were far more rigid than the ABA had thought appropriate.  Id. at 183. 
 75. See Charles F. Baird, The Habeas Corpus Revolution: A New Role for State Courts?, 27 
ST. MARY’S L.J. 297, 337-39 (1996) (noting that when considered in the aggregate, the new 
limitations on the scope of the federal writ substantially reduce the role of the federal judiciary in 
overseeing the criminal justice systems of the states); Blumberg, supra note 51, at 585 (finding the 
new law favors finality and timeliness over justice); Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Report 
Regarding Implementation of the American Bar Association’s Recommendations and Resolutions 
Concerning the Death Penalty and Calling for a Moratorium on Executions, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING 
POVERTY 3, 32-4 (1996) (asserting that Congress “gutted” the writ of habeas corpus when it passed 
the AEDPA); Gottlieb & Coyne, supra note 51, at 202 (holding the procedural requirements placed 
on habeas petitioners in recent decades have made difficult barriers impossible); Andrew Hammel, 
Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and Proposed Reconstruction of Death Penalty 
Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2002) (arguing the default doctrine as applied permits 
states to deprive state death row inmates of any meaningful post-conviction review); Kochan, supra 
note 21, at 399 (arguing AEDPA fails to address problems in habeas law that were present before 
AEDPA); Melissa L. Koehn, A Line in the Sand: The Supreme Court and the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, 32 TULSA L.J. 389, 401 (1997) (arguing that, because of the AEDPA, “habeas has probably 
ceased to exist altogether”); Mark Tushnet & Larry W. Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: 
The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1997) (suggesting that the AEDPA is a symbolic statute passed for political 
reasons that has done nothing, but caused interpretive problems for the courts and real problems for 
prisoners); Ward, supra note 5, at 28 (stating the already imposing odds against a federal habeas 
petitioner worsened under AEDPA); Kimberly Woolley, Note, Constitutional Interpretations of the 
Antiterrorism Act’s Habeas Corpus Provisions, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414 (1998) (presenting the 
argument that one could argue AEDPA is unconstitutional). 
 76. Gottlieb & Coyne, supra note 51, at 202.  The Act “does relatively little to change the 
balance already achieved by the Court over the past generation.  Instead, it can be read primarily as 
a codification of much of the Court’s work.”  Id.  But see Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap: 
Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 203, 222 (1998) (arguing the Act may 
codify Teague without including Teague’s exceptions or safeguards).  President Clinton’s signing 
15
Marshall: Carey v. Saffold
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
MARSHALL2.DOC 4/19/2004  10:25 AM 
564 AKRON LAW REVIEW [37:549 
have to deal with these challenges presented by the AEDPA one by 
one.77 
C. The California System 
A state prisoner can petition the California courts for habeas corpus 
review of his criminal conviction.78  “Every person unlawfully 
imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatever, 
may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such 
 
statement also leaves ambiguity as to the intent of the AEDPA on the issue of codification.  Id. at 
223.  He stated his faith in the federal courts to “interpret these provisions to preserve independent 
review of Federal legal claims and the bedrock constitutional principle of an independent judiciary.”  
Id. 
 77. E.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (finding the AEDPA’s retroactivity was 
improper where new legal consequences attached); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (finding 
a foreign national who did not exercise his rights under a treaty could not complain of a 
constitutional violation in federal habeas); Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) (finding an 
abuse of discretion to allow further habeas petitions two days before the execution date and 13 years 
after the crime); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998) (holding AEDPA does not 
require a mature habeas petition to seek authorization for a subsequent petition when the first 
petition was dismissed because it was pre-mature); Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998) 
(finding a declaratory judgment upon whether California qualifies under chapter 154 of AEDPA is 
inappropriate where there is no case or controversy); Slack v. McDaniel, 528 U.S. 949 (1999) 
(asking does AEDPA control the proceedings on appeal); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) 
(holding California’s Wende procedure provided the criminal appellant with minimum safeguards 
necessary to make an effective appeal in pursuance of the 14th Amendment); Williams v. Taylor, 
529 U.S. 420 (2000) (holding the petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on misconduct at 
trial because he was diligent in his effort to develop those facts in the state proceeding); Slack v. 
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (finding a habeas petition filed after the initial petition was 
dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies is not a successive petition); Artuz v. Bennett, 531 
U.S. 4 (2000) (stating the alleged failure of petitioner’s application to comply with state procedure, 
did not render it improperly filed for purposes of federal review); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 
172-73 (2001) (finding a federal habeas petition is not an application for state review and so, the 
limitation period was not tolled during the time of the first federal habeas petition); INS v. St. Cyr, 
533 U.S. 289 (2001) (finding the IIRIRA did not apply retroactively); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 
668 (2001) (holding an inmate can not submit a successive habeas petition where the Supreme 
Court did not hold the new rule to be retroactive to cases on collateral review); Carey v. Saffold, 
536 U.S. 214 (2002) (holding the petition for state court collateral review was pending in the time 
between the lower state court’s decision and the filing of a new petition in a higher court and as 
such, that time can be tolled for filing a federal habeas petition).  The Supreme Court has heard 20 
cases dealing with the AEDPA since its adoption in 1996, including, Hohn v. United States, 524 
U.S. 236 (1998), INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999), Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 
(1999), Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), and Horn 
v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266 (2002). 
 78. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 10, 11.  As of December 31, 2000, there were 161,808 
inmates in California.  State by State profiles: California, at http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/ 
states.html.  There were 613 inmates on death row in 2002.  Id.  Also, 128 inmates were removed 
from death row between 1973 and 2000, including 118 inmates whose convictions or sentences 
were overturned.  Id. 
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imprisonment or restraint.”79  The California Constitution grants the 
district courts, appellate courts and the state supreme court concurrent 
jurisdiction to grant writs of habeas corpus.80  The state supreme court 
also has jurisdiction to review an appeals court decision.81  Thus, a state 
prisoner has two avenues to seek California Supreme Court review; he 
can seek review of an appellate court decision or he can file an original 
habeas petition.82  The time limitations allotted to each avenue of review 
are significantly different.83  If a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
 
 79. CAL. PEN CODE § 1473 (2001).  The scope of the writ has been expanded to include “use 
by one lawfully in custody to obtain a declaration and enforcement of rights in confinement.”  In re 
Bittaker, 55 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1010 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).  Interestingly, in California, while the 
writ of habeas corpus actually fails the definition of a criminal action, it is still governed by the 
penal code.  Id.  The California Penal Code defines a criminal action as “the proceeding by which a 
party charged with a public offense is accused and brought to trial and punishment,” but the writ has 
not officially been changed to a civil proceeding.  Id.  It has also been suggested that the restrictions 
imposed by the AEDPA apply to “purely criminal habeas corpus petitions by death row inmates.”  
Id.  But see Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 181 (1906) (finding habeas corpus is a civil and not a 
criminal proceeding).  The California Constitution also contains a suspension clause; “[h]abeas 
corpus may not be suspended unless required by public safety in case of rebellion or invasion.”  
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
 80. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10. 
 81. CAL. CONST. art VI, § 11.  The appellate jurisdiction is defined as “the power to review 
and correct error in trial court orders and judgments.”  Leone v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 995 P.2d 191, 196 
(Cal. 2000).  This jurisdiction is exercised by either a direct appeal or in a habeas proceeding.  Id. at 
195.  This exercise of jurisdiction is different from conferring a “right of appeal” to litigants.  Id. at 
194.  Indeed, there is no appeal from a denial of habeas corpus by a superior court.  CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1506 (2000).  A petitioner must file a new petition in the appellate court.  Durdines v. 
People, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 217, 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). 
 82. See supra notes 74 & 81.  Thirty-seven states, including California allow the “high court 
both to reverse the denial of habeas corpus in the lower court and to grant an original petition for 
habeas outright.”  Carey, 536 U.S. at 228 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  However, in California, judicial 
preference however, has been expressed for the appellate process.  Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 
1006 (9th Cir. 1999).  The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the original writ system functions like the 
appellate system for several reasons.  Carey, 536 U.S. at 221-22.  But see Brief Amicus Curiae of 
the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 5-18, Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 
214 (2002) (No. 01-301) (arguing the California system is different in kind from typical “appeal” 
states, thus a petition for habeas relief is not “pending” between a lower state court’s decision and 
the filing of a further state action).  First, an appellate court in California can refuse to issue a writ in 
a petition that was not first filed in the lower court.  In re Ramirez, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 231-232 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001).  Second, an appellate court can give substantial deference to a lower court’s 
factual findings, thus acting as a review of the lower court.  In re Resendiz, 19 P.3d 1171, 1184 
(Cal. 2001). 
 83. Cal. Rules of Court, R 28(e), states a petitioner has ten days from the appeals court 
decision to file an appeal in the Supreme Court.  The original petition in the California Supreme 
Court must be filed within a reasonable time after the denial of the writ by the appellate court.  In re 
Harris, 855 P.2d 391, 398 (Cal. 1993).  The direct appeal from a criminal conviction is “the basic 
and primary means” for establishing justice.  In re Robbins, 959 P.2d 311, 316 (Cal. 1998).  Habeas 
corpus is an “extraordinary remedy” and by necessity requires procedural safeguards, such as time 
limits to govern its proper use.  Id. 
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states a prima facie case for relief, then a hearing on the merits will be 
held.84  The writ by itself is not enough to entitle the petitioner to be 
released from jail.85  The relief sought is only granted after the petitioner 
presents a successful case on the merits.86 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of Facts 
After a night of drinking and using cocaine, Tony Eugene Saffold 
and Rodney Reece87 arrived at the El Mexicano Restaurant owned by 
Maria and Augustin Michel shortly after the store opened at 7:00 am on 
the morning of September 29, 1989.88  Saffold entered the store, took 
beer from the refrigerator and then at gun point demanded that Augustin 
 
 84. Durdines, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d  at 220.  The writ does not entitle the petitioner to his release, 
but instead, a writ “triggers adversarial proceedings” and requires the respondent to file a reply, if 
the petitioner has stated a prima facie case for relief.  Id. Additionally, a meritless petition that does 
not make a prima facie case for relief can be denied without a subsequent hearing.  Id. at 221.  Also, 
in California, a summary denial of a petition for habeas is permitted.  For example in Powers v. City 
of Richmond, 893 P.2d 1160, 1177 (Cal. 1995), the California Supreme Court explained that an 
appellate court may deny a writ petition summarily.  A summary denial is a denial “without issuing 
an alternative writ or order to show cause, without affording the parties an opportunity for oral 
argument, and without issuing a written opinion—and that this power of summary denial 
distinguishes writ review from direct appeal.”  Id.  The California Supreme Court summarily denied 
Saffold’s writ petition based on the merits and for lack of diligence.  In re Saffold, No. S065746, 
1998 Cal. LEXIS 3379, at *1 (Cal. May 27, 1998).  Under the AEDPA, only a petition properly 
filed in the state court qualifies for the tolling provision.  Fernandez v. Sternes, 227 F.3d 977, 980 
(7th Cir. 2000).  Whether a petition is “properly filed” depends on state law, so that if a state court 
accepts and entertains it on the merits it has been “properly filed,” but if the state court rejects it as 
procedurally irregular it has not been “properly filed.”  Id.  Therefore, a summary denial based on a 
time limitation would not be considered properly filed, whereas a summary denial based on the 
merits would.  Harris v. Super. Ct., 500 F.2d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1974).  If a state court denies a 
petition for post conviction relief on procedural grounds, the petitioner has not exhausted his state 
remedies because the state exhaustion remedy requires a petition to be denied on the merits of the 
case.  Id.  Additionally, California determines the timeliness for filing an original writ petition on a 
“reasonableness” standard and does not specify a time limit.  Carey, 536 U.S. at 221.  The reason 
for the California Supreme Court’s denial of the writ is unclear.  Id. at 225-27.  In order to 
determine whether the filing of  Saffold’s petition is considered reasonable within the California 
system, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case.  Id. at 227. 
 85. See Durdines, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220. 
 86. Id.  There are many forms of relief that a habeas petition can facilitate.  See, e.g., Galvan 
v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 525 (1954) (petitioner filed a habeas petition for relief from deportation). 
 87. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
at *42a-4a, 2001 WL 34093978 (Joint Appendix) (No. 01-301), Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 
(2002) [hereinafter Memorandum].  Reece was originally charged with the robbery and murder at 
issue in this case.  Id at *41a.  Pursuant to a negotiated plea, Reece pled guilty to robbery and 
testified for the prosecution as to the events of September 28-29, 1996.  Id. 
 88. Id. at *44a. 
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give him the money from the cash register.89  After Augustin claimed 
there was no money in the register, Saffold fired at him twice, but only 
hit him once in the neck.90  Subsequently, Saffold demanded the money 
from Maria, she gave it to him and he fled.91 
B. Procedural History 
On April 3, 1990, Tony Eugene Saffold was convicted of first 
degree murder, assault with a firearm and two counts of robbery in the 
San Joaquin County Superior Court.92  The California Court of Appeal 
for the Third District modified his sentence, but affirmed the 
conviction.93  His conviction became final on direct review on April 15, 
1992.94 
On April 17, 1997, one week before the federal deadline for filing a 
federal habeas claim, imposed by the AEDPA,95 Saffold, acting pro se, 
filed a state habeas petition in the San Joaquin County Superior Court 
for ineffective assistance of counsel.96  The state trial court denied his 
petition.97  He filed a further petition in the California Court of Appeals 
five days later.98  That petition was denied.99  Saffold maintains that he 
 
 89. Id.  According to the theory of the case presented by the defense, it was Reece, not 
Saffold who committed the robbery and murder.  Id. at *49a. 
 90. Memorandum, supra note 87, at *44a. 
 91. Id. at *45a. 
 92. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 24, at 2.  The jury trial took place in the San Joaquin 
County Superior Court.  Id.  The superior court sentenced him to thirty years to life in state prison.  
Id. 
 93. Id.  The court stayed the concurrent sentence for assault with a firearm and affirmed the 
judgment as modified.  Id. 
 94. People v. Saffold, No. S025445, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 1709, at *1 (Cal. April 15, 1992) 
(denying Saffold’s petition for review of the appellate court affirmance of his state criminal 
conviction). 
 95. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2000) states that: 
A one-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus 
by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court.  The limitation period 
shall run from the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 
However, Saffold’s conviction became final before the AEDPA took effect, so the new one year 
federal statute of limitations began to run on AEDPA’s effective date, April 24, 1996, pursuant to 
Rule 6(a).  See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245-1246 (9th Cir. 2001).  The limitations 
period for Saffold to file a federal habeas claim would have ended on April 24, 1997, in the absence 
of tolling.  Id. 
 96. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 24, at 2.  Saffold delivered the petition to the San Joaquin 
prison authorities to be filed in the California Superior Court.  Id. 
 97. Carey, 536 U.S. at 217. 
 98. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 24, at 2.  Still acting pro se, Saffold again delivered the 
petition to the prison authorities to be filed in the appeals court. Id. 
 99. Id.  The state appellate court issued its opinion on June 26, 1997.  Saffold contends that he 
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was unaware of the appeals court decision until four and a half months 
later, at which time he then filed a petition in the California Supreme 
Court. 100  One week after the denial by the California high court, Saffold 
filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of California.101  The District Court denied the 
petition because he had failed to comply with the AEDPA’s one year 
deadline.102  The court held the federal statute of limitations period was 
not tolled during the intervals between the denial of one state petition 
and the filing of the next because no application was “pending” within 
the meaning of the AEDPA.103  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, 
holding the word “pending” included those intervals.104 
 
was not made aware of that decision until November 10, 1997.  Id. at 3. 
 100. Id.  Saffold filed the original petition to the state supreme court, still acting pro se, by 
delivering it to the prison authorities on the same day that he received notice of the appellate court 
decision, although it was not formally filed in the supreme court until November 13, 1997.  Id.  The 
California Supreme Court denied the petition on the merits and for lack of diligence on May 27, 
1998.  In re Saffold, No. S065746, 1998 Cal. LEXIS 3379, *1 (Cal. May 27, 1998). 
 101. Saffold v. Newland, D.C. No. CV-98-01040-DFL.  David F. Levi, District Judge 
Presiding.  Saffold was still acting pro se.  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 24, at 3.  Anthony 
Newland was the original defendant in this action and Tom L. Carey is his predecessor.  Pursuant to 
Fed. R. App. P. 43 (c)(2), Carey was substituted as the defendant when the case was before the 
United States Supreme Court.  Compare Saffold v. Carey, 295 F.3d 1024, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002) with 
Saffold v. Carey, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 2134 (2002) (listing Carey as the warden-defendant), and 
Newland v. Saffold, 534 U.S. 971 (2001) (granting certiorari to Saffold and listing Newland as the 
warden-defendant).  Rule 43 allows the automatic substitution of a party who is an office-holder: 
When a public officer who is a party to an appeal or other proceeding in an official 
capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action does not abate.  The 
public officer’s successor is automatically substituted as a party.  Proceedings following 
the substitution are to be in the name of the substituted party, but any misnomer that does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties may be disregarded.  An order of 
substitution may be entered at any time, but failure to enter an order does not affect the 
substitution. 
FED. R. APP. P. 43 (c)(2). 
 102. Id. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2000), there is a one-year statute of limitation 
period that began to run from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 
direct review” in the state court system. 
 103. 22 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2000).  “The time during which a properly filed application for 
State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is 
pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”  Id.  Because 
the petition was denied on procedural grounds, the substantive issues of the habeas claim were not 
addressed.  In re Saffold, No. S065746, 1998 Cal. LEXIS 3379, *1 (Cal. May 27, 1998). 
 104. Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1264-65 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, Newland v. 
Saffold, 534 U.S. 971 (2001), vacated by, remanded sub nom. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 
(2002).  After the district court announced its judgment, the Ninth Circuit decided how the tolling 
period for the exhaustion of state remedies should be tolled in Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003 (9th 
Cir. 1999).  The Ninth Circuit Court held “the statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first 
state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final 
collateral challenge” on the merits.  Id. at 1006.  The Ninth Circuit held the rule in Nino was 
applicable to Saffold’s case.  Saffold, 250 F.3d at 1265.  The Ninth Circuit also held that the 
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C. U. S. Supreme Court Decision 
In a five-to-four decision,105 the Supreme Court vacated and 
remanded the Ninth Circuit decision.106  The Court addressed three 
issues concerning the word “pending.”107  First, the Court decided the 
word “pending” does cover the time between a lower court’s decision 
and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court.108  Second, the 
Court determined that rule also applies to California’s state collateral 
review system, which allows for a further original state habeas petition 
in a higher court instead of a notice of appeal.109  Third, the Court left 
open the question, to be determined on remand, of whether the petition 
at issue was pending during the four and a half month interval between 
the state appellate court decision and the filing of the further petition in 
 
“mailbox rule” for pro se prisoners applied to Saffold’s habeas petitions to the state court and the 
federal court for calculating time tolled under AEDPA.  Id.  The mailbox rule for pro se prisoners 
allows the date of filing to be the date on which the prisoner gives the document to the prison 
authorities.  Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988); see also State ex rel. Johnson v. Whitley, 
648 So.2d 909 (La. 1995) (following Houston and finding a Louisiana prisoner’s pro se application 
is “filed” when he delivers it to the prisoner authorities).  The reasoning is that a prisoner, by giving 
the document to the prison authorities to forward to the clerk of courts within the time limit, has 
done all that he can be expected to do to have his appeal properly filed when he is without a lawyer.  
Id.  In this case, Saffold’s first state habeas petition was post-marked April 21, 1997, and the county 
court considered the petition filed as of May 1, 1997.  Memorandum, supra note 87, at 17a-18a.  
However, Saffold contends that he gave the petition to the prison authorities April 17, 1997, which 
was accepted by the district court for purposes of the decision.  Saffold, 250 F.3d at 1265.  Saffold’s 
case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings in the District Court to determine “whether 
and when Saffold delivered his petitions to prison authorities.”  Saffold, 250 F.3d at 1265. 
 105. Justice Breyer delivered the majority opinion in which Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter 
and Ginsburg joined.  See Carey, 536 U.S. at 216.  Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion in 
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined.  Id. at 227 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 106. Id. at 227. For a synopsis of the other criminal decisions rendered by the Supreme Court 
during the 2001-2002 term, see Charles H. Whitebread, Recent Criminal Decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court: The 2001-2002 Term, 39 COURT REVIEW 26 (2002).  The five-to-four 
decision in Carey was the most divisive of the four federal habeas cases that the Supreme Court 
heard.  Id.  The decision in Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002) (holding that the failure to comply 
with state requirements for continuance motions, in extraordinary cases, does not constitute 
adequate state grounds to bar federal habeas review), was six-to-three; the decision in Bell v. Cone, 
535 U.S. 685 (2002) (holding that a federal habeas petition challenging specific acts of an attorney’s 
representation is governed by Strickland v. Washington), was eight-to-one; and the decision in Horn 
v. Banks, 535 U.S. 266 (2002) (holding that Teague inquiries precede and are separate from the 
AEDPA inquiries), was per curiam. 
 107. Carey, 536 U.S. at 216. It is a trademark of Justice Breyer, who authored the majority 
opinion here, to look at three things, “legislative intent, the factual context in which the dispute 
arises, and the likely consequences of alternative resolutions of the dispute.”  Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Justice Breyer: Intentionalist, Pragmatist, and Empiricist, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 747, 751 (1995). 
 108. Carey, 536 U.S. at 221. 
 109. Id. at 221-25.  Saffold did not appeal the decision of the state appeals court, but filed a 
new habeas petition with the California Supreme Court.  Id. 
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the state supreme court, or was not pending because it failed to comply 
with state procedural rules.110 
The tripartite analysis began with the dictionary definition of the 
word “pending.”111  A habeas petition is pending in state court until the 
completion of the collateral review process.112  This includes, the time 
between the final decision of one court and the filing of an appeal in a 
higher court.113  The Court reasoned that “until the application has 
achieved final resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedures, 
by definition it remains ‘pending’.”114  On a policy basis, the Court 
recognized the inconsistency of requiring a state prisoner to file a federal 
petition before the state courts have properly finished their determination 
on the issue.115 
Next, the Court determined that rule was applicable to the 
procedures for state habeas corpus petitions in California.116  The Court 
made a distinction between “appeal” states and states, like California, 
that allow original petitions.117  The intervals between an appeal of a 
denial of a writ and the filing of a new petition after the denial of a writ 
were both considered applicable to the definition of “pending.”118 
 
 110. Id. at 225-27.  The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals to decide the question of whether the California Supreme Court’s denial “on the merits and 
for lack of diligence” meant that Saffold’s petition was untimely in the state court and therefore 
ineligible for tolling the federal statute of limitations.  Id. at 227.  The Supreme Court left open the 
option for the court to certify the question to the California Supreme Court.  Id. at 226-27. 
 111. Id. at 219; WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1669 (3d ed. 1993) 
(defining “pending” when used as an adjective, as “in continuance” or “not yet decided” and when 
used as a preposition, as “through the period of continuance . . . of” and “until the . . . completion 
of.”). 
 112. Carey, 536 U.S. at 219-20. 
 113. Id. at 219. 
 114. Id. at 220.  The Court recognized this reading of the AEDPA allows for the complete 
exhaustion of state remedies by the petitioner before having to file a federal claim.  Id. at 219-20.  
The Court also noted that no appellate court had interpreted the word “pending” in the manner 
proposed by California in this case.  See Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, 255 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 
2001); Melancon v. Kaylo, 259 F.3d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 2001); Payton v. Brigano, 256 F.3d 405, 408 
(6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1135 (2002); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 424-25 (3d 
Cir. 2000); Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2000); Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557, 
560-61 (4th Cir. 1999); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 
167 F.3d 132, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999).  But see Robinson v. Ricks, 163 F. Supp. 2d 155, 156 
(E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 115. Carey, 536 U.S. at 220. 
 116. Id. at 223. 
 117. Id. at 223-25; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 118. Carey, 536 U.S. at 224-25.  The rule when applying a federal statute that interacts with 
state procedure is to look at the function of the state procedure and not the name.  See Richfield Oil 
Corp. v. State Bd. of Equal., 329 U.S. 69, 84 (1946); Dep’t of Banking v. Pink, 317 U.S. 264, 268 
(1942).  The Court found “California’s system functions in ways sufficiently like other state systems 
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Finally, the Court reserved judgment on the application of the 
AEDPA tolling provision to this case.119  The California Supreme Court 
originally denied Saffold’s state habeas petition on the merits and for 
lack of diligence.120  It is unclear from that summary denial if Saffold’s 
petition was properly filed within the California system and therefore, 
qualifies for the AEDPA tolling provision.121  The Supreme Court 
remanded the case for a determination of that issue.122 
The dissent disagrees with both the majority’s “pending” rule and 
the characterization of the California habeas procedures.123  First, Justice 
 
of collateral review to bring intervals between a lower court decision and a filing of a new petition 
in a higher court within the scope of the statutory word ‘pending.’”  Carey, 536 U.S. at 223. 
 119. Carey, 536 U.S. at 225-226.  A habeas petition must be filed within a “reasonable” time.  
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.  If Saffold’s petition is found to have been filed outside 
of a “reasonable” time, then his application would not be considered as pending after the denial of 
his petition in the appellate court.  Carey, 536 U.S. at 226. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  While the Ninth Circuit considered the California Supreme Courts’ summary denial to 
have addressed the merits of the case, the United States Supreme Court remained unconvinced.  Id. 
at 225-26. 
 122. Id. at 227.  The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing and 
subsequently recalled the mandate on Saffold’s request.  Saffold v. Carey, 295 F.3d 1024, 1025 (9th 
Cir. 2002), recalled by Saffold v. Carey, 295 F.3d 1380 (9th Cir. 2002).  The question to be briefed 
simultaneously by the parties, in the Ninth Circuit is: “What is the proper disposition to be ordered 
by this court on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States, in light of the Supreme 
Court’s opinion . . . .”  Id.  On December 4, 2002, the Ninth Circuit found Saffold’s contention that 
the phrase “lack of diligence” referred to Saffold’s five-year delay in filing his initial state habeas 
petition and not the four and one-half month delay in filing his petition before the state supreme 
court to be persuasive.  Saffold v. Carey, 312 F.3d 1031, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2002).  The state argued 
that because “collateral review of Saffold’s conviction is functionally equivalent to direct review 
thereof, the time within which he is required to seek review from a higher court should likewise be 
the same for both forms of review.”  Id.  The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected that argument in light 
of five different orders denying habeas petitions that the California Supreme Court had issued at or 
around the same time as the denial of Saffold’s petition.  Id. at 1035.  Those decisions were 
important because they had been filed with the California Supreme Court more than four and one-
half months after the court of appeals rejected their petition, which was longer than Saffold, and 
none of those orders were denied for “lack of diligence.”  Id.  This suggests the denials were made 
solely on the merits of the claims and had nothing to do with the delay between the denial of the 
appellate court and the filing in the supreme court.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit held “these 
contemporaneous court orders demonstrate that the court’s finding of ‘lack of diligence’ applies 
instead to Saffold’s five-year delay in initially filing his habeas petition in state court.”  Id.  
Furthermore, California’s timeliness rule is not a condition to filing, but rather a condition to 
obtaining relief.  Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 11 (2000)  See also Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 
812 (9th Cir. 2002).  The Ninth Circuit concluded that since Saffold’s petition was not denied as 
untimely, he was “entitled to tolling for the four and one-half month period in question” under the 
AEDPA and the federal district court should review his federal petition on the merits.  Saffold, 312 
F.3d at 1036.  Thus, the case was remanded to the district court.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit limited its 
decision to Saffold’s case and declined to provide any “bright-line” rule for determining what 
constitutes “unreasonable” delay under California’s system.  Id. at n.1. 
 123. Carey, 536 U.S. at 236-37 (Kennedy J., dissenting). 
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Kennedy argues that the majority defines the word “pending” without 
reference to the application involved.124  It is difficult to conceptualize 
how a petition could be “pending” the day before the application was 
actually filed.125  Further, California law treats an appeal and an original 
writ as significantly different options.126  The Ninth Circuit should be 
reversed, the dissent argues, because an application cannot be pending if 
it has not been filed.127 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The writ of habeas corpus is more than just a part of the complex 
system of procedural rules and substantive laws that make up the 
criminal justice system, it is the “symbol and guardian of individual 
liberty” in the United States.128  A state prisoner is able to seek both state 
and federal habeas corpus review because both court systems share 
 
 124. Id. at 228-29.  An “application” is defined as a “document.”  Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 
8 (2000).  Within the context of the AEDPA, an application refers to “a specific legal document.”  
Carey, 536 U.S. at 229 (Kennedy J., dissenting).  Kennedy argues that the majority has determined 
“that ‘an application is pending as long as the ordinary state collateral review process is “in 
continuance.”’”  Id.  That proposition can only be true if the word “application” is interpreted to 
mean the “ordinary state collateral review process.”  Id.  He argues that the rule requires including 
“the multiple petitions, appeals, and other filings that constitute the ‘ordinary state collateral review 
process,’” into the definition of application.  Id. 
 125. Carey, 536 U.S. at 228-29.  The majority’s rule allows Saffold’s application to the 
California Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus to be considered “pending” before the 
application itself is actually filed as long as the application is filed within the time limitation 
imposed by the California system.  See id. 
 126. Id. at 231 (Kennedy J., dissenting).  First, while an original petition is permitted under 
California law, an appeal from an appellate court decision is preferred.  In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 
217 (Cal. 1983).  Second, a petitioner has ten days to appeal to the state supreme court.  CAL. RULE 
OF COURT R 28(b), 50(b) (2002).  The application remains “pending” in the lower court because the 
state supreme court could order the lower court to grant the application.  Carey, 536 U.S. at 230.  
Also, if the appeal is not taken within ten days, the state supreme court loses jurisdiction over it and 
the decision of the appellate court becomes final.  See CAL. RULE OF COURT R 24 (2002).  An 
original writ, however, begins “a new proceeding that ha[s] no proximate connection to the 
proceedings in the California Court of Appeal.”  Carey, 536 U.S. at 231; see also People v. Romero, 
883 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1994).  Thus, in order for an original writ to be considered pending under 
California law it must first be filed.  See In re Zany, 130 P. 710 (Cal. 1913).  The federal courts 
should respect this distinction in California law.  Carey, 536 U.S. at 233 (Kennedy J., dissenting). 
 127. Carey, 536 U.S. at 234-35.  Justice Kennedy admonishes the majority’s rule as 
impractical: “Whether an application is pending at any given moment should be susceptible of a yes 
or no answer.  On the Court’s theory the answer will often be “impossible to tell,” because it 
depends not on whether an application is under submission in a particular court but upon events that 
may occur at some later time.”  Id. 
 128. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968) (finding that a prisoner serving consecutive 
sentences was in custody for federal habeas purposes to challenge any one of the sentences because 
the opposite former rule undermined habeas corpus proceedings as the instrument for resolving fact 
issues not adequately developed in the original proceedings). 
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jurisdiction over constitutional claims.129  It is the declaration of the 
Supreme Court that state review must be sought first.130  It is the 
declaration of the legislature that certain time restrictions should be laid 
upon federal habeas review.131  These procedural requirements serve 
legitimate governmental interests.132  However, to the extent that they 
can not both be met, their combined existence raises serious questions as 
to the future of habeas corpus.133  The vindication of constitutional rights 
through habeas corpus becomes almost impossible if the procedural 
requirements for review cannot be met.134  In a country where liberty is 
 
 129. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  Compare article three, section two of the United 
States Constitution, which states the federal judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the 
Constitution, with article six, which states that state judges are bound by the United States 
Constitution.  See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 499 (1993) (noting the 
Supreme Court has the ultimate power to interpret the Constitution; however the Court relies on 
state courts “to fulfill the constitutional role as primary guarantor of federal rights” because 
certiorari review is limited); see also Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816) (holding the 
United States Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising under state tribunals). 
 130. See infra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.  E.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 
722 (1991).  The Supreme Court barred a state petitioner’s habeas claim because he failed to 
properly exhaust his state procedural requirements for state habeas.  Id. at 730.  Coleman had failed 
to appeal his state habeas claims to the Virginia Supreme Court within the thirty day time limitation.  
Id. at 727.  The exhaustion requirement comes ultimately from the federal system of government.  A 
state prisoner can seek federal habeas relief if a state court finds his federal (constitutional) claim to 
be without merit because “he seeks his release on a claim of unconstitutional denial of a right 
secured to him by the federal Constitution, the last word as to its merits is for federal and not state 
[courts].”  Brennan, supra note 2, at 4-5. 
 131. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (creating the first ever statute of limitations in federal habeas corpus); 
see also Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996) (stating that judgments about the proper 
scope of the writ are normally for Congress to make); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996) 
(quoting Lonchar); Wyzykowski v. Dep’t of Corr., 226 F.3d 1213, 1215 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Felker). 
 132. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).  When the Supreme Court held state 
violations of Fourth Amendment rights are not grounds for federal habeas relief, it explained that, 
“in some circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of 
criminal justice requires a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power.”  Id. 
(quoting Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976)).  But see Nowaczyk v. Warden, 299 F.3d 69, 
81 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that the norm in civil actions, including habeas proceedings is that a 
district court must exercise its full statutory jurisdiction). 
 133. C.f. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 66 (1922).  “The 
final cause of law is the welfare of society.  The rule that misses its aim cannot permanently justify 
its existence . . . .”  Id.  Despite the tolling provision in the AEDPA, the limitations period is often 
difficult to overcome.  Ward, supra note 5, at 28.  The AEDPA limitations period is an 
insurmountable obstacle.  Id. 
 134. C.f. Michael Ansaldi, The German Llewellyn, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 705 (1992).  There is 
some irony that this procedural safeguard has become embroiled with so many requirements in 
order to even qualify for the opportunity to use the safeguard: 
[T]he central problem of all law has to do with this still almost completely neglected 
descriptive science, with this “legal sociology,” this natural science of living law . . . .  
What we need to study, what we must know, is not how a legal rule reads, . . . but what 
25
Marshall: Carey v. Saffold
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
MARSHALL2.DOC 4/19/2004  10:25 AM 
574 AKRON LAW REVIEW [37:549 
held to be an unalienable right135  it seems hardly plausible that comity, 
finality and then fairness, would be the guiding values that inform our 
habeas jurisprudence. 136  And yet they are. 137  While there are important 
policy concerns on both sides of the argument, the values in the utility of 
administration must yield to the higher values of liberty and justice or 
else there is no future for the writ of habeas corpus.138 
A. Time Tells: The Purpose of Habeas Corpus 
The purpose of habeas corpus is to allow a forum to address 
constitutional violations arising out of criminal trials.139  State prisoners 
petition the federal court to hear the claims of illegal confinement arising 
out of a constitutional denial of rights.140  Justice Brennan once 
described the writ as, “that most important writ to a free people, 
affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in cases of illegal 
restraint or confinement.”141  This concept of vindicating constitutional 
rights is in conflict with a statue of limitations.142  A statute of 
 
the legal rule means.  Not in . . . the heaven of legal concepts, but in human experience.  
What happens in life with it? What does a law mean to ordinary people? 
Id. at 748-49 (emphasis added). 
 135. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) available at http://www.archives. 
gov/exhibit_hall/charters_of_freedom/declaration/declaration_transcription.html (Feb. 28, 2003) 
(holding “these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness”).  See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that 
concern about the injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent person is reflected in the 
“fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than 
to let a guilty man go free”). 
 136. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 697-701 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). But see, Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court’s Habeas 
Reform, 83 CAL. L. REV. 485, 491 (1995) (suggesting the listed habeas values of comity, finality 
and fairness are in the wrong order).  Comity is the idea that “federal courts should respect the 
determinations of state courts regarding the adjudication of constitutional claims.”  Id. at 489. 
 137. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 
364 (2000)).  The exhaustion requirement in federal habeas specifically furthers the values of 
comity, finality and federalism.  Id.  See also Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 558 (1998) 
(explaining that 2244(b) as amended by the AEDPA is grounded in respect for the finality of 
criminal judgments; the AEDPA’s central concern is that “merits of concluded criminal proceedings 
not be revisited in absence of a strong showing of actual innocence”). 
 138. See infra IV. C. 
 139. See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 202 (1830). 
 140. Brennan, supra note 2, at 4.  See also supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 141. Brennan, supra note 2, at 4. 
 142. See Richard Parker & Ugo Colella, Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort 
Claims Act: The Impact of Brockamp and Beggerly, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 885, 886 (1999). 
“Limitations periods are by their very nature harsh because they cut off a person’s rights without 
regard to the merits of the claim.”  Id. 
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss3/4
MARSHALL2.DOC 4/19/2004  10:25 AM 
2004] CAREY V. SAFFOLD 575 
limitations has as its goal, the extinguishment of substantive rights.143 
Justice Breyer noted the statutory purpose of the AEDPA is to 
encourage “prompt filings in federal court in order to protect the federal 
system from being forced to hear stale claims.”144  This is in direct 
contradiction to the role of the courts in the American legal system.145  
To encourage prompt filings is one thing; to prevent a federal claim 
because it is old, is quite another.  The responsibility of the Supreme 
Court is to the Constitution of the United States and not to judicial 
economy.146 
The Constitution of the United States grants both procedural and 
substantive rights to individuals. 147  Additionally, the Constitution 
outlines a two-tier system of government split between the federal and 
state governments.148  While the writ of habeas corpus is a procedural 
 
 143. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002) (citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 
178 (2001)). 
 144. Carey, 536 U.S. at 226.  Justice Breyer seems to be alluding to the idea that if a petitioner 
does not meet the state procedural requirements, the substantive merits of his claim are irrelevant 
even to the Supreme Court.  Id. 
 145. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA. (J. P. Mayer ed., Harper & Row 
1988) (1966).  As Alexis de Tocqueville noted at a very early stage in United States history, “the 
Americans have given their judges the right to base their decisions on the Constitution rather than 
on the laws.  In other words, they allow them not to apply laws which they consider 
unconstitutional.”  Id. at 100-01 (emphasis added). 
 146. See Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156, 165 (1957).  Justice Breyer’s statement is directly 
opposed to Justice Harlan’s understanding of the role of the Court: 
[T]he overriding responsibility of this Court is to the Constitution of the United States, 
no matter how late it may be that a violation of the Constitution is found to exist.  This 
Court may not disregard the Constitution because an appeal . . . has been made on the 
eve of execution.  We must be deaf to all suggestions that a valid appeal to the 
Constitution, even by a guilty man, comes too late, because courts, including this Court, 
were not earlier able to enforce what the Constitution demands.  The proponent before 
the Court is not the petitioner but the Constitution of the United States. 
Id. 
 147. See Brennan, supra note 2, at 4.  Due process in criminal proceedings includes the rights 
to a public and speedy trial, to put on a defense and the assistance of counsel, the prohibition against 
undue coercion or force, no cruel or unusual punishment, the presumption of innocence and the 
burden on the prosecution to prove guilt of every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.  
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides redress for any of those violations.  
Id.  Additionally, the writ of habeas corpus affords an opportunity for redress for these violations.  
The Fourteenth Amendment and the writ of habeas corpus are closely linked.  In 1867, when 
Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, the Congress also extended the writ of habeas 
corpus to state prisoners who have alleged violations of constitutional rights.  Id.  Those guarantees 
in the Constitution are “the higher law.”  Id.  See also Living the Gospel of Life: A Challenge to 
American Catholics, A Statement by the Catholic Bishops of the United States (June 30, 2003), 
available at http://www.nccbuscc.org/prolife/gospel.htm (noting that “[a]t the center of the moral 
vision of [the American] founding documents is the recognition of the rights of the human person”). 
 148. See Jack M. Beermann, 68 B.U.L. REV. 277, 335 (1988).  The relationship between the 
federal and state court systems may be enhanced by “a dialogue between the two systems” which 
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device used to protect constitutional rights,149 it is also a procedural 
device that must operate within both the state and federal judicial 
systems.150  The relationship between state governments and the federal 
government and specifically, between the state courts and the federal 
courts, affect habeas jurisprudence.151  Federal habeas takes into 
consideration both federal and state rules and interests.152  States’ 
interests in finality are protected through federal procedural rules, 
including the statute of limitations.  However, the AEDPA statute of 
limitations, in essence, puts an unreasonable time frame upon the 
validity of constitutional claims.153  Once the time limit is up, it is as if 
the claims are no longer valid.154  This forces the federal courts to 
 
allows them to engage in dialogue regarding the proper treatment of constitutional issues.  Id.  Both 
the state courts and the federal courts share in the enforcement of the Constitution.  A state prisoner 
can seek habeas redress in both court systems; however, “[s]ince he seeks his release on a claim of 
unconstitutional denial of a right secured to him by the federal Constitution, the last word as to its 
merits is for federal and not state tribunals.”  Brennan, supra note 2, at 5.  This “suprastate 
procedure” provides an opportunity to vindicate “the guarantees which are the foundation of our 
free society.”  Id.  This is a powerful incentive for state courts to protect against federal 
constitutional violations in the first instance.  Id. 
 149. See Hartman & Nyden, supra note 37, at 387.  For instance, the Warren Court used the 
writ “as its enforcement arm for the provisions of the Bill of Rights.”  Id. 
 150. Beerman, supra note 148, at 335.  Habeas is an exception to the rule that relitigation is not 
allowed.  Id.  The exception exists because it contributes to the effective cooperation between 
federal and state governments regarding criminal justice.  Id. 
 151. See 1995 Department of Justice Study, supra note 20, at 1.  Habeas corpus issues 
“highlight the complex interrelationship between the State and Federal courts in a Federal system of 
government.”  Id.  Specifically, federal courts have the jurisdiction to review state court criminal 
proceedings and possibly overturn them because of possible violations of federal constitutional 
provisions, despite the resources the state court system has already devoted on both the trial and on 
subsequent considerations of reversible error.  Id.  When a prisoner petitions the federal courts for 
habeas review on the claims already litigated in state court, this is essentially a request for re-
litigation.  Yackle, American Bar, supra note 23, at 172.  This “availability of federal habeas corpus 
as a sequel to state criminal prosecution can be a source of friction between the two systems.”  Id.  
For a discussion concerning the recent trend in the Supreme Court to favor states’ rights, see JOHN 
T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE 
STATES (2002). 
 152. Judge Friendly lists the states’ interests as deterring criminal activities, preventing long 
delays that create evidentiary difficulties, preserving judicial resources and achieving finality of 
criminal convictions.  Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal 
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 146-49 (1970). 
 153. Yackle, American Bar, supra note 23, at 181.  A federal district court will not hear a 
prisoner’s constitutional claims in his habeas petition if the petition is not filed properly before the 
one-year statute of limitations has run out.  Id. 
 154. See id. at 183 (finding the §2244 time limitation to “shut the federal courts’ doors” no 
matter who “comes knocking and whatever may be the nature or merits of the claims presented”).  
The 1990 ABA report on habeas corpus had recommended a one-year limitations period as “a 
substitute mechanism to move the case toward reasonably prompt completion, but only with 
adequate and sufficient tolling provisions to permit full and fair consideration of a petitioner’s 
claims.”  Id. at 182 (emphasis added). 
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choose the value of finality over any constitutional obligations.  It has 
been Congress’ job to set the scope of habeas corpus, but as the AEDPA 
provisions illustrate, Congress has picked an unfairly arbitrary time 
limit.155  If federal habeas is to continue to have a role as the “great writ 
of liberty” despite the AEDPA system, the Supreme Court must move 
away from formalities and back towards fairness.156 
Before the advent of the AEDPA, the Supreme Court dealt with the 
issue of time restrictions within habeas jurisprudence.157  The only 
statutory time limitation upon filing federal habeas petitions was 
contained in Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the 
United States District Courts.158  The Supreme Court interpreted the 
scope of Rule 9(a) shortly before the AEDPA was passed and 
specifically cautioned against any rule that would deprive a petitioner of 
“the protections of the Great Writ.”159 
The original premise in federal habeas was equity which left no 
reason for “simple rigid rules.”160  It remains true that “[c]onventional 
notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at 
stake and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged.”161  Indeed, 
 
 155. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.  See also Vicki Jackson, Congress and the 
Courts: Jurisdiction and Remedies: Introduction: Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the 
Future of the Federal Courts – Opposition, Agreement and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445, 2446-
2448 (1998) (stating one reason for the AEDPA and other legislation restricting the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts may be the conflict between Congress and the courts regarding the treatment of 
prisoners by the courts). 
 156. Duker, supra note 35, at 3. 
 157. E.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986); Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 
350 U.S. 116 (1956); United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469 (1947). 
 158. Pub. L. No. 94-426, 2(7), (8), 90 Stat. 1335 (1976) (current version at 28 U.S.C. app. § 
2254, R. 9(a) (2000)).  Rule 9(a) provides: “A petition may be dismissed if it appears that the 
state . . . has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition by delay in its filing.”  Id. 
 159. Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 324 (1996).  Lonchar was decided on April 1, 1996.  
Id.  The specific issue in that case was whether Rule 9(a) should be applied to a first habeas corpus 
petition.  Id. at 316.  The Court held that a first federal habeas petition should not be dismissed for 
reasons not encompassed within the framework of Rule 9(a).  Id. at 322.  Specifically, the Court 
stated, “[d]ismissal of a first federal habeas petition is a particularly serious matter, for that 
dismissal denies the petitioner the protections of the Great Writ entirely, risking injury to an 
important interest in human liberty.”  Id. at 324.  The Court was aware of the statute of limitations 
provision in the habeas reform bills in Congress at the time and cautioned, “the interest in 
permitting federal habeas review of a first petition is quite strong,” and “it is particularly important 
that any rule that would deprive inmates of all access to the writ should be both clear and fair.”  Id. 
at 328-330. 
 160. JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2.2 (3d ed. 1998). 
 161. United States v. Sanders, 373 US 1, 8 (1963).  The understanding of habeas included a 
timelessness.  United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475 (1947).  “[H]abeas corpus provides a 
remedy for jurisdictional and constitutional errors at the trial, without [the] limit of time.”  Id.  
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“swift justice demands more than just swiftness.”162  There is a 
fundamental difference between an ordinary right violation and a 
constitutional right violation.163  The harshness of a time limitation is 
starkly illustrated in cases where a habeas petitioner is facing a long 
prison sentence or the death penalty.164  Recent studies call into question 
the wisdom of instituting rigid rules within habeas when there is 
growing statistical evidence of wrongful convictions.165  The Court’s 
decision in Carey allows a state petitioner more time to meet the 
AEDPA regulations; however the reasoning of the Court suffers from 
the same disdain for equity that the minority opinion makes explicit.166 
B. For Whom Does the AEDPA Toll? 
The AEDPA’s tolling provision inserts some measure of equity into 
the statutory limitations period.  Assuming the purpose of the writ is still 
to safeguard individual liberties,167 the Supreme Court’s ruling in Carey 
 
Statutes of limitation, however, are generally based on the notion of repose.  Heck v. Humphrey, 
997 F.2d 355, 357 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that the policy behind the statute of limitations is “to bar 
stale suits”). 
 162. Henderson v. Bannan, 256 F.2d 363, 390 (6th Cir. 1958) (Stewart , J., dissenting). 
 163. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).  Justice Cardozo described 
constitutional rights as those “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental.”  Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).  Justice 
Powell explained that fundamental rights as those “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history.”  Moore 
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
 164. On average, there are nine years between being sentenced to death and exoneration.  
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Innocence: Freed from Death Row, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
article.php?scid=6&did=110 (last visited April 5, 2004).  The New York Times recently noted that 
of the 247 executions that happened in Texas between 1992 and 2002, nearly all were preceded “by 
an effort to obtain habeas corpus review in the federal courts.”  Greenhouse, supra note 12, at A1.  
Note the article stated an “effort” to obtain habeas review and not that most petitioners actually 
received habeas review. 
 165. See RONALD C. HUFF ET AL., CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 54 (1996).  The national wrongful conviction rate is 0.5%.  Id.  See also EDWARD 
CONNORS, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE 
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL, available at 
http://www.ilj.org/infotech/dnaevid.pdf (June 1996) (looking at the forensic factors in 28 cases of 
wrongful convictions); Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Innocence: Freed from Death Row, at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=6&did=110 (noting that between 1973 and 2002, 
102 people on death row have been exonerated); but see NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND 
EDUCATIONAL FUND, DEATH ROW U.S.A., Fall 1998, at 1 (noting that from roughly the same time 
period, 1973 to 1998, there have been 5,879 death sentences and 481 executions). 
 166. See infra part IV. C. 
 167. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-291 (1991).  In Harris, the Supreme Court 
recognized that “[t]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding 
individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action” and therefore, the writ must be 
“administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within 
its reach are surfaced and corrected.”  Id.  See also Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th 
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v. Saffold,168 in so far as it finds time in which state prisoners have to file 
a federal habeas petition, is a victory for equity. 
1. The Textual Argument 
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Carey v. Saffold169 use 
a textual argument, but arrive at very different conclusions.170  The 
disagreement is over which word from section 2244 (d)(2) should be 
interpreted.  The majority chose to focus on the word “pending” and the 
dissent chose the word “application.”  All things considered they are 
both correct as far as the meaning of the words go.171  The split in the 
Court arises from the source of the intratextual interpretation.172  The 
majority opinion uses section 2254 to explain that the statute of 
limitations can not be meant to conflict with the exhaustion 
requirement.173  The dissent, on the other hand, cites specific usage of 
 
Cir. 1991) (quoting Harris). 
 168. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Wilson R. Huhn, Teaching Legal Analysis Using a Pluralistic Model of Law, 36 GONZ. L. 
REV. 433 (2001).  “Textual analysis looks to the language used in the legal document under review, 
whether it is a constitution, a statute, a regulation, a contract, or a will.”  Id. at 441.  The starting 
point for understanding federal habeas is the text of the AEDPA and the specific provision at issue: 
“Where does the judge find the law which he embodies in his judgment?  There are times when the 
source is obvious.  The rule that fits the case may be supplied by the constitution or by statute.  If 
that is so, the judge looks no further.  The correspondence ascertained, his duty is to obey.”  
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 14 (1921).  However, if the 
language of the text is ambiguous, there must be more to the analysis.  There are three methods of 
textual interpretation: the plain meaning rule, intratextual arguments and canons of construction.  
Huhn, supra, at 441-42.  Each method “purports to achieve an objective definition of the words of 
the text.”  Id. at 443.  The intent of the lawgivers, precedent, policy and tradition are also valid 
sources of law.  Huhn, supra, at 440.  Precedent and policy are also relied on by both sides to 
support their holdings.  See infra, section IV. B. 2. 
 171. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 104, 1669 (1993) (defining 
pending as “in continuance” and defining application as “something applied or used in applying”).  
However, in the dissent’s view, “pending” can only apply to a filed “application.”  In the majority 
view, “pending” does not strictly require an application. 
 172. See Huhn, supra note 170, at 442.  Intratextual arguments are a “powerful technique for 
interpreting statutes.”  Id. at n.37.  In this technique, one part of the document is used to give 
meaning to another part.  Id. at 442.  E.g., M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 414-15 (1819); 
Dunnigan v. First Bank, 585 A.2d 659, 663 (Conn. 1991). 
 173. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-21 (2002).  “[A]n application is pending as long as 
the ordinary state collateral review process is ‘in continuance’ . . .  In other words, until the 
application has achieved final resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedures, by 
definition it remains ‘pending.’”  Id. at 220.  See also 28 U.S.C. 2254 (b)(1) (stating “[a]n 
application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of 
a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that . . . the applicant has exhausted the remedies 
available in the courts of the State”).  Previously, in Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001), the 
Supreme Court held, as a matter of statutory interpretation and legislative purpose, that when 
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the word “application.”174  For the majority, an application is pending 
until there is no possibility of further state review.175  For the dissent, an 
application is only pending if a legal document has been filed and a state 
court is actively reviewing the claim.176 
2. The Policy Argument177 
The majority opinion acknowledges that a state petitioner must 
comply with both the one-year time limit and the exhaustion 
requirement.178  Exhaustion requires the petitioner to “invoke[e] one 
complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.”179  
 
Congress used the phrase “State post-conviction or other collateral review” in the tolling provision 
of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2), the word “State” was intended to modify the entire phrase “post-
conviction or other collateral review.”  Id. at 174.  Therefore, a pending prior federal habeas petition 
did not toll the limitation period under AEDPA.  Id. at 171-82. 
 174. Carey, 536 U.S. at 228-29 (Kennedy, J. dissenting).  An “application” is a “document.”  
Id. (citing the legal meaning of  “application” as derived from Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) 
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2242-43).  This type of reliance on the text of the statute is a trademark of Justice 
Scalia, who joined the dissenting opinion in this case.  “For Scalia, the ordinary social and 
dictionary meaning of individual words is the most important, and often decisive, ingredient of his 
analysis . . . .”  David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia’s 
Fidelity to His Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1389 (1999).  Justice O’Connor, 
on the other hand, who joined the majority opinion in this case, draws a line at strict textual 
interpretation, “[w]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious 
constitutional problems” and instead suggests that the Court should “construe the statute to avoid 
such problems.”  Huhn, supra note 170, at n.276 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 223 
(1991) (O’Connor, J. dissenting)).  A strict interpretation of “application” creates a constitutional 
problem by preventing a petitioner from complying with both the exhaustion requirement and the 
filing deadline in the AEDPA.  The majority’s construction of the word “pending” alleviates that 
problem. 
 175. Carey, 536 U.S. at 219-20. 
 176. The intent of the lawgivers, in this case the legislature, is a principle method of 
interpretation.  See Huhn, supra note 170, at 443.  However, that is not relied upon heavily in this 
case.  One reason could be the haphazard way the AEDPA legislation was pushed through 
Congress.  See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  Another reason could be that the AEDPA 
largely codified existing common law and so the Court need only look to precedent for support of 
the text.  See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 177. See Huhn, supra note 170, at 446-49.  In the policy analysis, the court first “predicts the 
consequences that will flow from giving the law one interpretation or another” and then chooses and 
evaluates the consequences to determine which is consistent with “the underlying values of the 
law.”  Id. at 449. 
 178. Carey, 536 U.S. at 219-20.  “A federal habeas petitioner must exhaust state remedies 
before he can obtain federal habeas relief.”  Id.  See also Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557, 561 (4th Cir. 
1999) (holding that the time must be tolled until all of the state remedies were exhausted).  Before 
the AEDPA, Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), articulated the common-law rule of exhaustion.  
See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 179. Carey, 536 U.S. at 220 (quoting O’Sullivan v. Boerckerl, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999)).  
Exhaustion is “[a] dialogue between the two systems.”  Beerman, supra note 148, at 335.  See also 
Manning v. Alexander, 912 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1990), where the court explains that exhaustion is 
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By incorporating the entire state appellate review process into the tolling 
provision, the Court allows the state petitioner to meet the requirements 
of exhaustion first and then deal with the limitation period.180  A federal 
district court can not hear a state petition prior to exhaustion under 
section 2254.181  This intra-textual interpretation allows the state 
petitioner to comply with both requirements separately.182 
The dissent’s intra-textual interpretation relies on the letter of the 
law.  The dissent ignores the inherent conflict between the statute of 
limitations and exhaustion.183  Instead, they focus on the word 
“application” as it pertains to an actual document.184  The dissent opines 
that California habeas law further supports this definition because the 
original petition in the trial court has no proximate connection to the new 
 
satisfied when the highest court in the state in which the petitioner was convicted has been given the 
opportunity to make a decision on the petitioner’s claims.  Id. at 881.  Further, “[t]he fact that the 
state court does not address the merits of the claim does not preclude a finding of exhaustion.”  Id. 
at 883.  Exhaustion applies even if a claim was procedurally defaulted in state court, because in such 
cases there are no longer remedies available for the petitioner to exhaust.  See Gray v. Netherland, 
518 U.S. 152, 161 (1996); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991); Engle v. Isaac, 456 
U.S. 107, 125-26 n.28 (1982). 
 180. Carey, 536 U.S. at 219-21.  If the one-year deadline was running during the state appellate 
process and the time limit was up before the appellate process was concluded, then a state petitioner 
would be forced to file a federal habeas petition to meet the deadline and yet, the district court could 
not hear it because exhaustion has not been met.  See id.  It would put the federal courts in an 
awkward position of having “to contend with habeas petitions that are in once sense unlawful 
(because the claims have not been exhausted) but in another sense required by law (because they 
would otherwise be barred by the one-year statue of limitations).”  Id.  C.f. Cowans v. Artuz, 14 F. 
Supp. 2d 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding the statute of limitations cannot be circumvented by filing a 
habeas petition containing only unexhausted claims, and then by having that petition held in 
suspense until petitioner exhausts state remedies).  But see 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b) (2) (stating a 
habeas petition may be denied on the merits in federal court, “notwithstanding the failure of the 
applicant to exhaust the remedies available” in state courts). 
 181. 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  The AEDPA clearly defines the exhaustion requirement: “An applicant 
shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the 
meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available 
procedure, the question presented.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(c).  However, § 2254(b)(2) allows a federal 
court to deny relief on the merits despite the failure of a prisoner to exhaust state remedies. 
 182. The Ninth Circuit’s main reason in deciding the tolling rule, which the Supreme Court 
adopted in Carey, affected exhaustion.  Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1104 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(considering the time tolled for exhaustion of state remedies pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 2244(d) 
included the interval between the disposition of an appeal or post-conviction petition and the filing 
of an appeal or successive petition at the next state appellate level and determining that for purposes 
of 28 U.S.C.S. § 2244(d), the time must be tolled for the entire period in which a petitioner was 
appropriately pursuing and exhausting his state remedies). 
 183. See Tushnet, supra note 75, at 6, 29. 
 184. Carey, 536 U.S. at 229 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  “The word, ‘application,’ appears in 
numerous other places in the laws governing federal habeas corpus.”  Id.  “Application” cannot 
support the meaning that the majority seeks to give it.  Id. 
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petition that is required to start a proceeding in an appellate court.185  
The dissent is concerned that the majority’s rule will require federal 
courts to unnecessarily define the “ordinary collateral review process” of 
each state.186  It would have been “easier” to apply the clear words of the 
statute to the “clear law in California.”187 
 
 185. Id.  “When a prisoner files an appeal, the original application remains pending in the 
lower court, but when a prisoner files an original writ, there is no application pending in any lower 
court.”  Id. at 231.  See also People v. Romero, 883 P.2d 388, 391 (Cal. 1994). 
 186. Carey, 536 U.S. at 233. 
 187. Id. at 237.  However, it seems that California law is not always clear.  There seems to be 
no uniform time limit that triggers the label of a petition that was “unreasonably delayed” in 
California.  See In re Sanders, 981 P.2d 1038, 1056 (Cal. 1999) (finding a three year delay between 
the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court and the filing of a state habeas motion 
excused because of attorney error); In re Robbins, 959 P.2d 311, 317 (Cal. 1998) (finding 
petitioners claims were not time barred due to the demonstration of good cause for the delay); In re 
Harris, 855 P.2d 391 (Cal. 1993) (finding no delay in petitioner’s collateral attack on his sentence 
due to his status as a juvenile even though it was not brought up on direct appeal); In re Clark, 855 
P.2d 729, 762 (Cal. 1993) (denying a subsequent habeas petition filed six years after the conviction 
was final, but only two years after the new habeas rules were adopted because no cause for delay 
was shown); In re Stankewitz, 708 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Cal. 1985) (granting a habeas petition 
containing allegations of jury misconduct despite a year delay in filing); In re Moss, 221 Cal. Rptr. 
645 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (finding a nine month delay in filing a habeas petition was not time barred 
because petitioner could not obtain counsel); In re Spears, 204 Cal. Rptr. 333 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(finding an eighteen month delay excused); In re Saunders, 472 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1970) (allowing a 
petition because the lack of competent counsel caused the delay); In re Mitchell, 437 P.2d 289, 292 
(Cal. 1968) (finding petitioner’s ignorance of the law sufficient to overcome a timeliness bar due to 
a four year delay); In re James, 240 P.2d 596, 600-601 (Cal. 1952) (holding the state habeas claim 
was not “unreasonably delayed” despite the passage of some time).  But see In re Tsaturyan, 2002 
WL 1614107 (Cal. 2002); People v. Miller, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 198-199 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) 
(finding a ten year delay between the conviction and the habeas petition was untimely); In re Wells, 
434 P.2d 613, 615 (Cal. 1967) (finding a habeas claim as to a first conviction while serving time for 
a second conviction is time barred); In re Hancock, 136 Cal. Rptr. 901, 903 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) 
(holding the state habeas claim was “unreasonably delayed”).  Additionally, the supposed “clear” 
words of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations and tolling provisions have created a lot of litigation.  
E.g., Brooks v. Walls, 279 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that even if a state court referred 
to the merits of an untimely petition, it does not mean the petition is considered timely and therefore 
“properly filed” for the purposes of the AEDPA); Brown v. Roe, 279 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(reversing a magistrate’s decision because it failed to consider an equitable tolling claim under the 
AEDPA); Johnson v. United States, 246 F.3d 655, 657-58 (6th Cir. 2001) (Although the AEDPA, 
does not expressly define when a conviction becomes final, the appellate court presumes Congress 
to have been aware that, for purposes of a collateral attack, a conviction becomes final at the 
conclusion of direct review and direct review for a federal prisoner who files a petition for certiorari 
with the Supreme Court concludes when the court either denies the petition or decides the case on 
the merits); Valentine v. Francis, 270 F.3d 1032, 1034-35 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a state 
petition for post-conviction or other collateral review that does not address one or more of the 
grounds of the federal habeas petition in question is not a review with respect to the pertinent 
judgment or claim within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2), and therefore does not toll the AEDPA one-
year statute of limitations); Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 286 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding the one-
year statute of limitations does not begin to run until the time for filing a petition for a writ of 
certiorari for direct review in the United States Supreme Court has expired). 
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3. It Tolls for Saffold 
Eugene Saffold is entitled to statutory tolling under the AEDPA 
provision.188  The Ninth Circuit made a critical distinction between the 
time that had elapsed between Saffold’s original conviction and his first 
filing of a habeas petition and the time between the denial by the 
appellate court and his subsequent filing in the California Supreme 
Court.189  On remand, it was decided that since the California court did 
not deny Saffold’s petition as untimely, his petition is considered 
“properly filed” for the purposes of the federal tolling provision and so 
he qualified for statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2).190 
The key to the Ninth Circuit’s decision was the procedural decision 
that the California Supreme Court made.191  In order for the AEDPA to 
toll, it is now very important to know on what grounds the state court 
denied the state petition.192  Any state petition found to be untimely 
under the state procedural rules will not qualify as “properly filed” 
(addressing the dissent’s concerns) under the AEDPA and so the issue of 
tolling is foreclosed.193  The federal courts look to state procedural rules 
 
 188. Saffold v. Carey, 312 F.3d 1031 (9th  Cir. 2002); see supra note 121 and accompanying 
text. 
 189. Saffold, 312 F.3d at 1034-35 (distinguishing In re Sampson, No. S066428, 1998 Cal. 
LEXIS 3404 (May 27, 1998) (a nine-month delay); In re Davis, No. S067677, 1998 Cal. LEXIS 
3484 (May 27, 1998) (18-month delay); In re Villegas, No. S065899, 1998 Cal. LEXIS 3202 (May 
20, 1998) (seven-month delay)); see also Romero v. Roe, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1149 (C.D. Cal. 
2001) (15-month delay). 
 190. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 191. The California Supreme Court denied Saffold’s state habeas petition without an opinion, 
stating only that the petition was denied, “on the merits and for lack of diligence.”  In re Saffold, 
1998 Cal. LEXIS 3379, *1 (Cal. May 27, 1998). 
 192. See, e.g., Brooks v. Walls, 301 F.3d 839, 842-43 (7th Cir. 2002).  There is however, some 
indication that individual district courts have not all reached the same decision.  See Varnado v. 
Cain, No. 02-1286, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3351, *30 (E.D. La. Mar. 5, 2003) (noting that Carey 
may have left open some possibility that a court will address the merits of a claim despite its 
untimeliness). 
 193. See Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 10-11 (2000), aff’g 199 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 1999).  In 
Artuz, a New York trial court orally denied respondent’s 1995 motion to vacate his state conviction 
and then, the federal district court dismissed respondent’s federal habeas petition as untimely, 
noting that it was filed more than one year after the effective date of the AEDPA.  Artuz, 531 U.S. 
at 6.  In reversing and remanding, the Second Circuit concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), which 
tolls the time that a “properly filed” application for state post-conviction relief is pending, also tolls 
the one-year grace period which the Second Circuit has allowed for the filing of applications 
challenging pre-AEDPA convictions; that, in the absence of a written order, respondent’s 1995 
motion was still pending under § 2244(d)(2); and that the 1995 motion was properly filed because it 
complied with rules governing whether an application for state post-conviction relief is “recognized 
as such” under state law.  It thus rejected petitioner’s contention that the 1995 application was not 
properly filed because the claims it contained were procedurally barred under New York law.  Id. at 
7.  The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit and held that an application for state post-
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to determine whether the petition was “properly filed” and therefore 
“pending” for the purposes of the AEDPA.194  Whether that same 
petition qualifies for federal tolling is a separate inquiry.195  However, 
the federal courts must look to the state procedural decisions or make 
state procedural decisions in order to determine federal statutory 
tolling.196  All the while, the merits of the petition are never addressed.197 
C. Fairness 
The norm in federal habeas cases is that the petitions contain a 
procedural flaw.198  While the rule in Carey may have allowed for more 
time to file a federal habeas claim, this does not mean petitioners always 
meet the tolling qualifications or time limit.199  Despite the reality that 
 
conviction relief is “properly filed” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) so long as its delivery to and 
acceptance by the court complies with the applicable rules governing such filings under state law.  
Id..  That the application allegedly contains claims that are procedurally barred from review on the 
merits does not bear on whether the application was “properly filed,” but instead speaks only to 
whether relief is appropriate.  Id.  The question whether an application has been “properly filed” is 
quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious and 
free of procedural bar.  Id. at 9-10.  Therefore, a “properly filed” and pending application for state 
post-conviction relief, even if it contains procedurally barred claims, is sufficient to toll the 
AEDPA’s one-year grace period for filing applications challenging pre-AEDPA convictions.  Id. at 
6-11.  See also Pratt v. Greiner, 306 F.3d 1190, 1195-96 (2d Cir. 2002) (defining “properly filed”). 
 194. See Phillips v. Vaughn, No. 02-2109, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1652, *5-6 (3d Cir. Jan. 29, 
2003).  The Third Circuit has definitively followed Carey.  “Carey made [it] quite clear that to be 
deemed ‘properly filed,’ an application for collateral review in state court must satisfy the state’s 
timeliness requirements.”  Id. at *5.  The Third Circuit declared that Carey overruled the prior case 
of Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2001).  Id. at *4-5.  In Nara, the Third Circuit, following 
Artuz, took a broad interpretation of what is “properly filed” under Pennsylvania law.  264 F.3d at 
316.  Initially, at least one district court read Nara and Carey as being potentially compatible by 
reading Carey as narrowly applying only to the California system.  Satterfield v. Johnson, 218 F. 
Supp. 2d 715, 722 (E.D. Pa. 2002).  Specifically the district court noted Carey’s lack of reference to 
Artuz, and so declined to decide whether Carey overruled Nara since Carey did not rely on Artuz as 
Nara did.  Id. at 722 n.8.  The subsequent decision in Phillips, however, has decided that question in 
the Third Circuit.  Phillips v. Vaughn, No. 02-2109, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1652 (3d Cir. Jan. 29, 
2003). 
 195. See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text. 
 196. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). 
 197. See Saffold v. Carey, 312 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2002) (deeming Carey’s habeas petition as 
timely filed).  The merits of Carey’s habeas petition have yet to be addressed.  Id. at 1036 
(remanding the case for a decision on the merits). 
 198. Nowaczyk v. Warden, 299 F.3d 69, 71 (1st Cir. 2002).  See also Murray v. Giarratano, 
492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (holding states are not required to provide counsel in habeas proceedings, not 
even for death row inmates).  Ninety-three percent of prisoners were acting pro se in their habeas 
cases in 1995.  1995 Department of Justice Study, supra note 20, at 14.   
 199. E.g., Bridges v. Johnson, 284 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that an 
application for sentence review did not affect a defendant’s post-conviction remedies and thus did 
not toll the AEDPA one-year limitations period, and so the district court properly found that 
prisoner’s 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254 petition was time-barred and further, that sentence review did not 
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few petitioners will actually obtain federal review of the merits of their 
claims because of this rule, the statute of limitations has not been 
deemed unconstitutional.200  For pro se petitioners, the time limitation is 
even more daunting.201  Curiously, there seems to be some support for 
the idea that the AEDPA was intended to incorporate notions of 
fairness.202  There is a need to find equitable alternatives for prisoners to 
have a forum to present their case.203 
 
qualify under the AEDPA as state post-conviction or other collateral review because it was not an 
attack on the constitutionality or legal correctness of a sentence or judgment); Malcom v. Payne, 
281 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding a clemency petition does not toll the AEDPA clock and the 
decision to make such a filing, in place of a federal habeas petition does not warrant equitable 
tolling); Abela v. Martin, 309 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 318 F.3d 1155 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (finding the period in which the United States Supreme Court considers a petition for 
certiorari following the state collateral review process is not part of the actual state collateral review 
process as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and hence, not eligible for tolling of the one-year 
statute of limitations period in 28 U.S.C.S. § 2244(d)(1)).  See also supra note 133 and 
accompanying text. 
 200. See Lucidore v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 209 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2000); Hyatt v. 
United States, 207 F.3d 831, 832 (6th Cir. 2000); Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 
2000); Wyzykowski v. Dep’t of Corr., 226 F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000); Turner v. Johnson, 
177 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998). 
But see Sessions, supra note 10 (arguing that the AEDPA’s statute of limitations violates the 
Constitution). 
 201. See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Defunding of the Post Conviction Defense Organizations 
as a Denial of the Right to Counsel, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 863, 914 (1996) (noting that Congress cut 
the funding for the program that provided attorneys for prisoners wishing to pursue post-conviction 
remedies); Graham Hughes, Sandbagging Constitutional Rights: Federal Habeas Corpus and the 
Procedural Default Principle, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 321 (1987-1988) (arguing that 
procedural default is overbroad, empirically unsupported, and punishes defendants instead of 
counsel); Lurana S. Snow, Prisoners in the Federal Courts, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 295, 296 (1997) 
(noting that many prisoners file habeas petitions pro se); Ronald J. Tabak, Commentary, Capital 
Punishment: Is There Any Habeas Left in this Corpus?, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 523, 539 (1996) 
(noting the time limit will be hard for attorneys to meet). 
 202. See Jake Sussman, Note, Unlimited Innocence: Recognizing an “Actual Innocence” 
Exception to AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 343, 359 n.74 
(listing lawmakers’ intent to achieve a fair result).  See, e.g., Orrin Hatch, Tighter Rules Were 
Needed, USA TODAY, Jan. 20, 2000, at 16A (“Congress’ reforms carefully preserve the most 
important function of habeas corpus, to guarantee that innocent persons will not be illegally 
imprisoned or executed, and explicitly permit repeated petitions that clearly and convincingly 
present new evidence of innocence.”); 142 CONG. REC. S3465 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (statement 
of Sen. Warner) (discussing Sen. Conf. Rep. on S. 735, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996) (“I have faith that our State courts respect our constitutional rights, and in the 
exceptional case where Federal rights have been violated, defendants retain very reasonable access 
to Federal courts to prove their innocence.”).   
 203. See Molly McDonough, Balance of Power: Prosecutors Challenge Historic Commutation 
of 171 Death Sentences, ABA JOURNAL E-REPORT 1 (Jan. 17, 2003), at http://www.abanet.org/ 
journal/ereport/j17challenge.html.  The Governor of Illinois chose his own alternative to the entire 
problem of unconstitutional convictions by commuting 171 death sentences.  Id.  This option does 
not seem to be the appropriate middle ground though, because Cook County State’s Attorney 
Richard A. Devine filed a petition, asserting Gov. Ryan “overstepped his authority in 10 of those 
37
Marshall: Carey v. Saffold
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
MARSHALL2.DOC 4/19/2004  10:25 AM 
586 AKRON LAW REVIEW [37:549 
Equitable tolling is one way to insert equity into the AEDPA statute 
of limitations.  The doctrine of equitable tolling stops a statute of 
limitation from expiring when justice requires.204  In other words, 
equitable tolling allows a court to hear an action when literal application 
of a statute of limitation would be inequitable.205  Several circuits have 
approached this issue already and found that the AEDPA allows for 
equitable tolling.206  To qualify for equitable tolling, a petitioner must 
make an additional showing of some sort of exceptional circumstance.207  
The mistakes or miscalculations by an inmate’s counsel do not usually 
qualify the client for equitable tolling.208 
 
cases where defendants were awaiting resentencing.”  Id.  “Devine contends that there was no final 
sentence in those cases and therefore there was no way for Ryan to commute a sentence of death to 
life imprisonment.”  Id.  “Prosecutors are also considering reviving murder charges against 
defendants suspected in multiple slayings,” where some charges “were dropped after the defendants 
were [originally] sentenced to death in the first cases to go to trial.”  Id.  This is arguably a breach of 
the governor’s power to commute sentences.  See id.  The counter argument, however, is that the 
entire system is unreliable.  See id. 
 204. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1390 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 205. Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 1999).  The second inquiry into many 
cases that are found to fall outside of the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is often whether 
the petitioner qualifies for equitable tolling.  See, e.g., Phillips v. Vaughn, No. 02-2109, 2003 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 1652 (3d Cir. Jan. 29, 2003) (addressing first statutory tolling and then equitable 
tolling). 
 206. Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 2002); Griffin v. Rogers, 308 F.3d 647 (6th 
Cir. 2002); Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Wynn, 292 
F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2002); White v. Curtis, No. 01-1493, 2002 U.S. Cir. WL 1752272, at *3 (6th 
Cir. July 26, 2002); Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 329-30 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that in 
theory, the AEDPA’s limitation period was subject to equitable tolling); Smith v. McGinnis, 208 
F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that the limitation period for filing habeas petitions may be 
equitably tolled in extraordinary circumstances); Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 
2000); Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 204 F.3d 907, 909 (9th Cir. 2000); Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 
811 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that the AEDPA’s limitation period can be tolled for exceptional 
circumstances); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that as a limitation, § 
2244 may be subject to tolling because it is not jurisdictional); Miller v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 145 
F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that the limitations period could be equitably tolled in 
extraordinary circumstances); Thurman v. Lavigne, No. Civ. 01-CV-72312-DT, 2002 U.S. Dist. WL 
31245262, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2002); but see Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066-67 
(9th Cir. 2002); Testa v. Bissonnette, No. CIV.A.01-11609-DPW, 2002 U.S. Dist. WL 31194869 
(D. Mass Sept. 27, 2002). 
 207. See, e.g., Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (permitting equitable 
tolling when petitioner can show exceptional circumstances that are beyond his control and 
unavoidable with diligence); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999) (allowing equitable 
tolling in three circumstances, if the petitioner was actively misled by the defendant, if there was an 
extraordinary barrier to petitioner asserting his rights, or if petitioner timely asserted his rights 
unwittingly in the wrong forum). 
 208. E.g., Smaldone v. Senkowski, 273 F.3d 133, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
attorney’s error in reading the AEDPA’s statute of limitations provision did not qualify for equitable 
tolling); Harris, 209 F.3d at 330-31 (holding that the attorney’s innocent misreading of the 
limitation period did not qualify for equitable tolling); Taliani v. Chrans, 189 F.3d 597, 597-98 (7th 
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Another option for equity is an actual innocence exception.209  This 
exception is consistent with the writ’s purpose to safeguard liberty.210  
There are many ways an actual innocence exception can be construed.211  
The courts have dealt with this issue in a limited context.212 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Finding time in federal habeas corpus, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the tolling provisions of the AEDPA to include the time 
between the rejection of a state petition and the filing of a new one in a 
higher court.213  The debate over the extent of the use of the writ is 
ongoing and will continue for years to come.214  The purpose of the writ 
of habeas corpus must always remain in the forefront of conversations 
about re-structuring the writ and procedural ramifications.215  It is the 
role of the courts to safeguard individual liberties by interpreting the 
AEDPA in ways that allow prisoners access to the writ.  This will ensure 
fairness.  Other considerations of comity and finality should be second to 
fairness.  The uniqueness of habeas corpus in the procedural armory of 
our law cannot be too often emphasized.216  It is easy in a time of grief to 
 
Cir. 1999) (holding that attorney’s mistake in calculating the statute of limitations period did not 
qualify for equitable tolling). 
 209. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 160, at § 2.5 (noting that actual innocence was almost 
a qualification for awarding habeas relief); Steiker, supra note 49, at 315 (noting that actual 
innocence was always a reason to overlook procedural obstacles to prevent continued incarceration 
or execution). 
 210. United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  The Court 
reasoned that: 
Just as there is typically no statute of limitations for first-degree murder – for the obvious 
reason that it would be intolerable to let a cold-blooded murderer escape justice through 
the mere passage of time – so too one may ask whether it is tolerable to put a time limit 
on when someone wrongly convicted of murder must prove his innocence or face 
extinction. 
Id. 
 211. For instance, under Justice Friendly’s regime, a requirement of a minimum showing of 
innocence would “enable courts of first instance to screen out rather rapidly a great multitude of 
applications not deserving their attention and devote their time to those few where injustice may 
have been done.”  Friendly, supra note 152, at 150.  However, this would narrow the scope of the 
writ because Friendly’s particular version would only extend habeas corpus to people who were 
probably innocent.  See id. at 172.  See also Sussman, supra note 202, at 349-50. 
 212. E.g., Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that the statute of 
limitation is subject to equitable tolling when a prisoner is actually innocent); O’Neal v. Lampert, 
199 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1067 (D. Or. 2002) (holding the same); but see Cousin v. Lensing, 310 F.3d. 
843, 849 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 213. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). 
 214. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Ex Parte Yerger, 
39
Marshall: Carey v. Saffold
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
MARSHALL2.DOC 4/19/2004  10:25 AM 
588 AKRON LAW REVIEW [37:549 
forsake certain liberties for the sake of security, but those same liberties 
may then be lost forever.217  It is not an understatement to say that the 
unavailability of the writ in totalitarian societies is a clue to the 
importance of the writ in our democratic society.218  The Supreme Court 
must find the moral leadership required to pursue justice despite the fear 
inspired by terror.219  If justice does not prevail in the form of federal 
habeas corpus review, it will be as Alexis de Tocqueville predicted: 
If the lights that guide us ever go out, they will fade little by little, as if 
of their own accord.  Confining ourselves to practice, we may lose 
sight of basic principles, and when these have been entirely forgotten, 
we may apply the methods derived from them badly; we might be left 
without the capacity to invent new methods, and only able to make a 
clumsy and an unintelligent use of wise procedures no longer 
understood.220 
Karen M. Marshall 
 
75 U.S. 85, 95 (1868) (noting the writ “has been for centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient 
defense of personal freedom”). 
 217. See Melissa K. Mathews, Restoring the Imperial Presidency: An Examination of 
President Bush’s New Emergency Powers, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 455, 459 (2002) 
(exploring the ramifications of the Patriot Act); see, e.g., The Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot 
Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 218. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 518. 
 219. See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see generally Thomas C. Martin, Note, The 
Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 201, 201-206 (1996) 
(listing terrorist activities that inspired the bill that became the AEDPA). 
 220. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 145, at 464. 
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